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ABSTRACT:
This thesis is presented for a Master of Arts and Science Degree at the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville, from the College of Liberal Arts, Department of Philosophy,
with a concentration in medical ethics.
The thesis’s argument assumes that rules of ethics or morality should be rules and
guidelines of uniformity and therefore universal in nature and scope. In that assumption,
the thesis adheres to the present problematic state of ethics, and in particular, medical
ethics. In response to that state it asks: without imprint from religious morality, upon
what foundation can we design a system for medical ethics? In particular, does the rule of
law and interpretation of our Federal Constitutional rights in the United States of America
offer any guidance for a foundation of medical ethics?
Still more specifically, the issues of concern here will be the following. First this
thesis will explore the connection between the medical term “autonomy” and the legal
terms “privacy” and “liberty.” Secondly, the thesis will focus on an examination of the
nature of medical autonomy which the Supreme Court of the United States reached in the
landmark Roe v. Wade decision.

Is the interpretation of the Constitution of the United

States of America, adopted in that decision, an interpretation that defines such rights as
the Constitutional right of privacy, a method that can be depended upon for guidance or
foundational support for a right of medical autonomy? If not, what conclusions can be
reached by this analysis?
iv

As the thesis will conclude, while medical autonomy and what the courts call
“privacy” and “liberty” when discussing medical cases appear to be the same thing,
interpretation of the Constitution of the United States of America does not provide us
with a relevant tool for guidance with respect to the ethics of medical autonomy. The
standard interpretation of the Roe v. Wade decision as concerning a national, and
therefore uniform right of privacy in making medical decisions, akin to medical definitions
of autonomy, was destroyed by the United States Supreme Court decision in the cases
known as Washington/Vacco.

-iv-

We are not here to advocate abortion. We do not ask this
Court to rule that abortion is good or desirable in any particular
situation.
We are here to advocate that the decisions as to whether
or not a particular woman will continue to carry or will terminate
a pregnancy is a decision that should be made by that individual,
that in fact she has a constitutional right to make that decision
for herself, and that the State has shown no interest in [or
sufficient legal status to allow interfering with that decision.
Sarah Weddington, in oral argument
before the Supreme Court of the United States
in Roe v. Wade, as related in A Question of Choice.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION:
Emerson’s brief waffled: “Whether one derives the right
of privacy from a composite of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments, from the Ninth Amendment or from the ‘liberty’
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, such a constitutional right
has been specifically recognized by this court. . .”
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)1
In the last forty years there has been a decrease of paternalism by the medical
profession and a growing sign of strength in consideration of personal autonomy and
privacy in the arena of medical choices.2
Concerning this development, on what foundation would we place the
philosophical architecture of medical ethics? Physician John Bell, writing in 1847,
proposed in the opening line of his “Introduction to the Code of Medical Ethics” that
“Medical Ethics, as a branch of general ethics, must rest on the basis of religion and
morality.”3
Today, there are still attempts to ground philosophy in theological reflection.
However, one of the methods of philosophical ethics has been an attempt to separate this
study from religious teaching and place it upon a foundation in the secular world. This is

1

N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in
American History, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2001), p. 83.

2

For a very good article on this point, see Alan Goldman, “The Refutation of Medical
Paternalism”, in Steinbock, Arras & London, Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine, 6th
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), p. 56ff. Goldman’s article will hereinafter
be referred to as Goldman.
3

John Bell, “Introduction to the Code of Medical Ethics”, in The Codification of Medical
Morality, edited by R. Baker (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1955), pp. 65-72.
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why philosophy studies the teachings of Aristotle, and his search for eudaimonia, analyzes
David Hume’s theories of human nature, or Kant’s theories of universalized maxims or
laws of morality, which would be analogous to the laws of nature.4
Of course, this is much too broad a concern for this thesis.

An attempt will be

made to focus on a small portion of this tide of events, namely, on the ethics of autonomy,
and how this subject relates to concerns in jurisprudence regarding “privacy” and “liberty”
in important United States court decisions. Along the same lines, we will consider issues
involving the word “choice” as used both by the medical profession in speaking of patient
autonomy and by courts in addressing the rights of liberty and privacy. One of the first
conclusions of this thesis will be that the medical term “autonomy” and the legal terms of
“liberty” and “privacy” appear to mean the same thing when courts have attempted to
determine individual medical rights.
As we will see in Chapter Two of this work, autonomy is one of the major issues
in today’s philosophical conversation concerning medical ethics, and has been on the
forefront of this discussion for some time but particularly since the publication of

4

See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, in Oxford World’s Classics, translated with an
introduction by David Ross, revised by J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition, with text
revised and notes by P.H. Nidditch, analytical index by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998), Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals,
translated and edited by Mary Gregor, with an introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also, Henry Sidgwick, The
Methods of Ethics, 7th edition, with a foreword by John Rawls (Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 1981) for an illustrative study of these theories and comparisons
and conclusions about them.
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Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.5
In the United States of America we historically and legally proclaim this
philosophical value of autonomy. It is written between the lines of our political theories of
representative democracy and the values we place on individual choice. For instance, the
second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America
states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.6
In addition, the preamble of the United States Constitution reads as follows:
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the
common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. . .7
While the study of the philosophy of medical ethics expresses this issue in terms of the
right of autonomy, the practice of constitutional interpretation has come to express it as
the right of privacy and liberty. For several decades beginning in the 1960s, theories of

5

This work is now in its 5th edition: Beauchamp & Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2001). This work is known as one of the supports of
the principlism method of medical ethics. As we will see in Chapter Two, this method is
considered important to many writers in medical ethics. Hereinafter referred to as
Beauchamp & Childress.
6

The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America, U.S. National
Archives & Records Administration, at http://www.archives.gov/nation_archives. The
emphasis has been added.
7

The Constitution of the United States of America, copy obtained from the Legal
Information Institute at http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.preamble.
The emphasis has been added.
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medical ethics moved towards this emphasis on personal autonomy and the choice of the
patient and away from the traditional paternal viewpoint of the medical professional.8

In

that same time period, developments in the law expressed the right of privacy in the Roe
v. Wade decision as a woman’s right to a medical abortion and concluded with the
concern of the right of physician-assisted suicide.9

The latter right, which would seem to

many to follow from the of Roe v. Wade decision, and its basis in constitutional
interpretation, came before the United States Supreme Court in what has become known
as the Washington/Vacco decisions.10
Rather than the uniformity and universality that one would cherish in a guideline
for an ethical code, the United States has seen the murder of abortion-performing doctors
and the jailing of Dr. Kevorkian for the taking of a human life while assisting a patient in
performing suicide. These last matters, both the killing of abortion physicians and the
jailing of Dr. Kevorkian, are the result of judgments not by the common sense of modern
civilization, but rather by the influence of an ethical code created by religious

8

There has been a counter-trend to this movement towards autonomy in recent years with
claims being made that medical patients are too autonomous and that perhaps autonomy
needs to be balanced with other considerations such as benevolence.
9

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For the non-legal person not familiar with case
decision citation, the easiest way to review the decisions of the United States Supreme
Court or state supreme courts is to visit FindLaw.com, a web service provided by a
foundation within Cornell University.

10

Washington v. Glucksberg, 96 U.S. 110 (1997) and Vacco v. Quill, 95 U.S. 1858
(1997). These cases came to the United States Supreme Court as separate cases but
were consolidated for hearing. Individually, the cases will be referred to as Washington
v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. When discussed jointly, they will be referred to as
Washington/Vacco.
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indoctrination and laws influenced for thousands of years by such religious morality.
Both the murder of physicians assisting in abortion and public reaction to physicianassisted suicide, even where the patient is riddled with intolerable pain, come from a
religious teaching that values human life, any such life, even when its existence and value
is medically questioned. Almost all movement against the right to abortion based on
privacy and attacks on the right to physician-assisted suicide come from organizations and
individuals tied to religious ideology.
The destruction of a human fetus has never been recognized as murder in the
English or American common law. However, it is considered by some to be a form of
murder before birth. Physician-assisted suicide, even in the most desperate circumstances
of medical illness, is generally thought to be killing before life is through. Both are
considered unmoral and unethical by some religious teachings in the Western world.11
In this historical context, the choice of autonomy, and of privacy, even in medical
choices, was allegedly outweighed by the state’s interest in the protection of human life.
However, in 1973 the United States Supreme Court, in the Roe v. Wade decision,
acknowledged and recognized a United States Constitutional right of privacy, a right of
autonomy in making medical choices.12

This was the declaration by the Supreme Court

11

There are some arguments in the literature that the Roman Catholic Church did not
always treat abortion “as a sin.” The thought of unwanted pregnancy, many times the
creation of “the sin of sex,” made abortion palpable rather than bringing a child to term
out of wedlock. This changed dramatically in the last one-hundred years.
12

Roe v. Wade is a “landmark” case decision, according to both legal scholars and
historians. It was chosen for inclusion in the Landmark Law Cases and American Society
series. See Hull & Hoffer: Roe v. Wade: The Abortion Rights Controversy in American
History (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001). This book is hereinafter
-5-

of the United States that a right of privacy existed in a long line of prior decisions by the
Court and was protected by the American Constitution.13

In our governmental system

this judicial power of the United States Supreme Court of course outweighed both the
legislative power that normally creates the law and the executive power that enforces such
laws.
Could this constitutional interpretation of our rights be extended to form a
foundation or at least give guidance to a national and uniform ethical policy concerning
medical concepts of autonomy? Following the Roe v. Wade decision in 1973, it first
appeared that this decision and its affirmation of a constitutional right to privacy would
bring about a national policy for the medical ethics community concerning autonomy and
the making of medical decisions, at least in the abortion rights arena.14 Many thought, at

referred to as Hull & Hoffer.
13

Sarah Weddington relates that she first started to research the law to overcome the
Texas anti-abortion statute by looking at the “privacy” decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court:
Soon I was finding U.S. Supreme Court decisions supporting a position
that there were certain personal decisions the government had no business making.
I ran to find Ron [her husband and a fellow lawyer] after I read
Griswold v. Connecticut. . .
Sarah Weddington: A Question of Choice (New York: Penguin Books, 1992, 2nd
ed.1993), p. 41. This book is hereinafter referred to as Weddington.
14

This is documented carefully by Weddington, p. 151:
There were spontaneous celebrations for the Court’s decision around
the country. Reactions from many recognized women leaders flashed
across the news wires. People often tell me that they remember vividly
where they were when they heard about two events: the death of President
John F. Kennedy and the decision in Roe v. Wade . . . .
Also, see citations to David J. Garrow: Liberty and Sexuality: The Right to Privacy and
the Making of Roe v. Wade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, 2nd ed.1998)
below.
-6-

the time, that the decision meant much more than this and that it was a tremendous victory
for individual rights. This was a decision of vast importance for patient decision-making
and personal medical autonomy.
This thesis will argue that a careful examination of the United States Supreme
Court and other state court decisions following Roe v. Wade shows that it was hoped and
believed by many in the medical and legal communities that this decision would develop a
national policy of autonomy in medical decision-making. This conclusion about the Roe v.
Wade decision was evidenced by the In Re Quinlan case decided by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in 1976.15

A careful examination of this case will be given to support

the argument that this court decision was based expressly on the United States Supreme
Court decision in Roe v. Wade. This decision also extended the right of autonomous
choices to a medical patient’s guardian who had petitioned the court for such authority.
The thesis’s argument will follow the development of other cases that soon
followed, such as the later decision by the same New Jersey Supreme Court of In Re
Conroy,16 and another United States Supreme Court decision concerning the case of
Nancy Cruzan.17

It is argued that these cases established further rights and guidelines of

medical choice built upon the foundation and guidance of the right of privacy established
by Roe v. Wade.

15

In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2nd 647 (1976). Hereinafter referred to as the Quinlan
decision.

16

In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A. 2nd 1209 (1985). Hereinafter referred to as Conroy.

17

Cruzan v. Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Hereinafter referred to as Cruzan.
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However, this progress toward establishing a national ethical policy, and therefore
a policy of uniformity and universality concerning medical rights of autonomy, through the
interpretation of United States Supreme Court decisions was terminated for the present by
a set of companion cases heard before the United States Supreme Court in 1997, and
known as the Washington/Vacco decisions.18

In these decisions the Supreme Court of

the United States did not follow the Roe v. Wade decision. Decided twenty-five years
earlier, Roe v. Wade declared a constitutional right of privacy which was national in
scope. However, the decision in the Washington/Vacco cases declared the underlying
issues of medical autonomy concerning the legal rights of patient decision-making
concerning the issue of physician-assisted suicide to be fully within the determination of
the fifty different states.
How, without overturning the decision of Roe v. Wade, could the Supreme Court
of the United States reach such drastically different results? How can one case give the
constitutional right to a mother to allow a physician to abort a fetus, alleged by some to be
murder, and yet the other decision deny such a right to allow a physician to end one’s own
life? Does medical autonomy in decision-making exist as a constitutional right, or does it
not?
This thesis will show that starting with a line of argument developed by the Cruzan
decision, the Supreme Court of the United States decisions backed away from a national
policy and the declaration of a constitutionally protected right in medical decision making.
At least on the issue of physician-assisted suicide, once again the policy in these matters of
18

See footnote 10.
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medical autonomy is to be decided by the individual states. This, as a result, has left the
United States of America without a national policy of determinative autonomy in medical
decision making on some issues, allowing the State of Oregon to unilaterally sanction
physician-assisted death while it remains illegal in all other states. At the same time,
abortion, as a constitutional right, exists throughout the nation on a uniform scale.19 Both
of these results are based solely on the interpretation of the United States Constitution by
the Supreme Court of the United States, yet arriving at two very different conclusions.
The right to end your life by physician-assisted suicide remains a right only within the
State of Oregon.20 This means that there is a lack of uniformity and universality
concerning the medical right of autonomy within the United States of America. Some
portions of this right are national in scope. Some however, are non-existent, or available
only to the citizens of certain states.
This is a very inconsistent result, and one that does not speak well for the use of
19

David Garrow believes that the abortion right will always remain, leaving us in a
dichotomy of ethical guidance. He states:
The Supreme Court’s firm commitment to Casey accurately reflected
the remarkable imposing stability of American public opinion about
abortion. Twenty-five years’ evidence indicated that while significant
numerical variations could be generated by differently worded questions,
a clear majority of Americans opposed any governmental action to overturn the constitutional consensus represented by Casey.
Garrow, p. 737.

20

Known as the Oregon Death With Dignity Act, this statute became law in 1997 after a
second public referendum. It is codified as ORS.127.800 and can be found on
FindLaw.com. The Act first started as a public initiative in 1994 by the citizens of
Oregon, not its legislature. It was held in abeyance by Federal Court injunction until the
Supreme Court decision of Washington/Vacco which allowed such decisions to become
law, but only on a state-by-state basis. A lot of information can be found about the Act on
the Oregon Department of Health Services web site, www.dhs.state.or.us.
-9-

constitutional interpretation of our rights, even of our rights in the medical ethics field, to
arrive at a universal and uniform national policy. The Roe v. Wade decision, as we will
see, is very specific: we, as Americans, have the right to privacy in medical choices.
However, no matter how specific this constitutional interpretation is, and no matter that it
still exists as good constitutional law in this country, having never been fully overturned,
the Washington/Vacco decision and other cases have limited the extent to which it can be
regarded as determinative of our rights in other areas of medical choice. Thus we
continue to have the tragic result of such circumstances as the Terri Schiavo case in the
State of Florida21, where without a national policy and declaration of the ethical rights
existent in medical choices, a guardian, a family, a state legislature and governor have
battled for fourteen years to establish or deny the right that Roe v. Wade presumptively
gave Ms. Quinlan’s surrogate almost thirty years ago.
In reality, this thesis will argue that these very issues were clarified by the Quinlan
case back in 1976. A surrogate, under Quinlan, which followed the implications of Roe
v. Wade, has the right to make these type of choices for such a person as Ms. Schiavo.
Mr. Schiavo has been clothed in those legal garments for almost all of the fourteen years
of this Florida struggle, and wanted to terminate his wife’s technological life support many
years ago. Several years ago a Florida court decision cleared the way for this to happen.
Unfortunately, Ms. Schiavo’s parents have been allowed to interfere, as well as the
21

See Schiavo v. Governor of Florida Jeb Bush, et. al., SC FL 04-925 (October 14,
2004). Additional litigation continued from the fall of 2004 to the resolution of the case
with Ms. Schiavo’s death in March of 2005, but not until President Bush and the US
Congress passed special legislation and five appeals were made to the US Supreme Court.
-10-

legislature and governor of Florida, and then the United States Congress and President, in
a situation that would have never been legally allowed, if Roe v. Wade had been allowed
to stand for what Quinlan stated it supported.
The problem is as this thesis describes: Cruzan started a process in 1990 that the
Washington/Vacco decisions cemented: the state courts can no longer look to Roe v.
Wade for a national policy. Each state is allowed to come up with its own policy, based
on its on procedural rules and other matters. This will give every person like Ms.
Schiavo’s parents a chance to get in the litigation door. With Cruzan and the disaster of
the Washington/Vacco decisions, that is what is left of the judicial issue of autonomy.
Without these United States Supreme Court decisions, Mr. Schiavo’s relief would have
been a direct appeal to the Federal Court on the grounds that there was a violation of Roe
v. Wade, i.e., the national right of privacy, a Federal Constitutional Right, uniform and
complete across the United States.
This is a drastic and terrible conclusion to the promise and brilliance of the Roe v.
Wade decision, a decision that was about so much more than a right to abortion. Roe v.
Wade was the hope for medical autonomy through privacy of choice. It was the test of
time, based on many, many years of constitutional interpretations as to our rights under
the most basic of our legal foundations.22 Despite them, we cannot find an effective,
uniform and universal solution to the quandary of medical ethics or autonomy within the
limits of such constitutional interpretation. What was the hope and dream of an important
22

In deciding Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the United States looked back
historically over more than one hundred years of Supreme Court decisions that had
solidly built the right of privacy as a constitutional right.
-11-

constitutional right, the right of privacy, has evolved into a United States Supreme Court
that is indifferent to the need for a coherent system, a national system, a uniform system of
medical ethics, even on the issue of privacy and autonomy.23

23

This is best summed up by a statement from Sarah Weddington:
When Roe was decided, pro-choice forces were at the top of the
seesaw. By 1989 that had reversed and the opposition to abortion
was at the top, as a result of being better funded, more vigilant and
passionate, and of having elected presidents who agreed with them
in 1980, 1984, and 1988. They were often seen in demonstrations
and picketing abortion providers. Pro-choice forces were at a low point,
having been unable to blunt or stop the juggernaut or to energize the
majority of citizens who supported reproductive freedom.
Weddington, p. 211.
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CHAPTER TWO:
WHAT ARE THE CONCEPTS OF AUTONOMY, PRIVACY & LIBERTY
CONCERNING MEDICAL ETHICS?
Roe’s declaration that abortion was no longer
a crime made the case into a symbol–for advocates of
abortion rights a symbol of autonomy, of choice, and
ultimately women’s control of their reproductive lives. . .24
What does autonomy mean when used in the medical context by bioethicists?
How does this differ, if at all, from the definitions of “liberty” and “privacy” which have
been used by the courts and legal profession in determining our legal rights?
Alan Goldman has stated this concerning autonomy:
Personal autonomy over important decisions in one’s life, the ability
to attempt to realize one’s own value ordering, is indeed so important
that normally no amount of other goods, pleasures or avoidance of
personal evils can take precedence. . .Especially when decisions are
important to the course of our lives, we are unwilling to relinquish
them to others, even in exchange for a higher probability of happiness
or less risk of suffering. . .25
In the meantime, when Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress designed their theory
of medical ethics they settled on a system of medical principles.26

There are four major

principles in their system, autonomy, nonmalefience, beneficence, and justice,27 and

24

Hull & Hoffer, p. 4.

25

Goldman, p. 63. The emphasis is added.

26

Beauchamp & Childress. See footnote 3.

27

Ibid., p. 12.
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Beauchamp and Childress take up autonomy first.28 The authors quickly state that
“Respect for the autonomous choices of persons runs as deep in common morality as any
principle, but little agreement exists about its nature, scope, or strength.”29 They also
state:
Personal autonomy is, at a minimum, self-rule that is free from
both controlling interference by others and from limitations
such as inadequate understanding, that prevent meaningful choice.30
Now “choice” is an interesting word, and as we will see, it became the battle-cry for the
women’s movement that led into the movement for legalization of abortion.
Beauchamp and Childress go on to state that two conditions are necessary for the
type of autonomy that they have in mind, liberty and agency, and they define agency as
having the capacity for intentional action.31 The authors also point out that when you
bring these concepts to the medical arena, many problems develop because of “the
patient’s dependent condition and the medical professional’s authoritative position.”32
Beauchamp & Childrress’s theory of autonomy is also tied to two philosophers of the

28

Beauchamp & Childress, p. 57. However, the authors stress that its order of
presentation “does not imply that this principle has priority over all other principles.”

29

Ibid.

30

Ibid. p. 58. The emphasis is added to the quote. However, it should be noted
that this statement is footnoted by Beauchamp and Childress and refers to “Two
Concepts of Liberty” from Four Essays on Liberty, Isaiah Berlin (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1969) and also to texts on criminal law and those of self respect. Again,
the emphasis is added, but points out that Beauchamp & Childress’s concept of autonomy
is drawn immediately from concepts of both liberty and criminal law.
31

Ibid.

32

Ibid., p. 61.
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modern period, Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill:
Kant argued that respect for autonomy flows from the recognition
that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to
determine his or her own moral destiny. To violate a person’s autonomy
is to treat that person merely as a means, that is, in accordance with
others’ goals without regard to that person’s own goals . . . Mill’s position requires both not interfering with and actively strengthening autonomous expression, whereas Kant’s entails a moral imperative of respectful treatment of persons as ends in themselves.33
Gregory Pence states Mill’s contribution as follows:
. . . John Stuart Mill (in On Liberty) applied his principle of harm to
define or delimit private or “self-regarding” actions. Mill held that so far
as such actions are concerned, the individual should be autonomous: that
the source of values is individual experiences and choices (in other words
values are not imposed by the state); and that the state should have no
power to force an individual to act for the public good or even in his own
best interest. In essence, Mill saw individual rights as conditions limiting
what government may do to citizens34.
Beauchamp and Childress believe that this philosophical theory equips autonomy
with both a positive and a negative obligation:
As a negative obligation: Autonomous actions should not be subjected
to controlling constraints by others . . .As a positive obligation, this
principle requires respectful treatments in disclosing information and
fostering autonomous decision-making.35

33

Beauchamp & Childress, p. 64. The reference to Kant’s work is to Immanuel Kant:
Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959),
translated by Lewis White Beck, and also, I. Kant: “The Doctrine of Virtue”, Part II,
Metaphysics of Morals, translated by Mary Gregor (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 127. The emphasis is added.
34

Gregory E. Pence: Classic Cases in Medical Ethics: Accounts of Cases that have
Shaped Medical Ethics with Philosophical, Legal and Historical Background, 4th edition,
(Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2004), p. 78. The text is hereinafter referred to as Pence.
35

Beauchamp & Childress, p. 64.
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Obviously, such positive and negative autonomous obligations may come into conflict, and
may come into conflict with other sorts of obligations. The authors note that “Respect
for autonomy has only prima facie standing and can sometimes be overridden by
competing moral considerations.”36 In other words, there may be times when the principle
of autonomy must be given up or affected by one of the other three major principles in
Beauchamp and Childress’s system.

In much the same way, Beauchamp and Childress

believe that such a balancing must exist between concepts in ethical theory construction, a
process now known as reflective equilibrium, a term borrowed from the philosopher John
Rawls.37 Rawls regarded such justification as a “reflective testing of our moral beliefs,
moral principles, theoretical postulates, and other relevant moral beliefs in order to make
them as coherent as possible.”38 Obviously this same type of reflective testing or balancing
is necessary when faced with conflicts between the concept of autonomy and the other
major principles.39
This type of process, whether called reflective equilibrium or something else, is

36

Beauchamp & Childress, p. 65.
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Ibid, p. 398. Beauchamp and Childress actually use the term in the text prior to this
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“judgments as provisionally fixed points” which were “liable to revision.” The footnote
by Beauchamp & Childress at that point is to John Rawls: A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971; revised edition 1999), with reference to
multiple pages.
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very closely akin to what is involved in deliberations by the Supreme Court of the United
States and other courts in balancing the competing state interests against the interests of
liberty, privacy and choice that will dominate the discussions of the case decisions which
follow in this thesis. This process is also regarded as a source of authority in medical
ethics. This can be seen when Beauchamp and Childress conclude their section on
autonomy with the following:
We have also maintained that construing respect for autonomy as a
principle with priority over all other moral principles, rather than one
principle in a framework of prima facie principles, gives it too much
weight. The human moral community, indeed morality itself, is rooted
no less deeply in the three clusters of principles to be discussed in the
next three chapters.40
While Beauchamp and Childress discuss “privacy” in an entirely different part of
their book,41 the part dealing with “professional-patient relationships,” this does not mean
that they think it is totally separate from the concept of autonomy. Here the authors
specifically mention the development of considerations of “privacy” in the Supreme Court
of the United States, even mentioning Griswold v. Connecticut by name.42 The decision of
Roe v. Wade is mentioned only in a footnote to the text, at which point the authors state:
It seems inapposite to make a right that protects individual or familial
interests one of privacy rather than liberty or autonomy. However,
the right to privacy encompasses both rights of limited physical and
informational access, as well as rights of decisional freedom, and
reducing this right to a right to be free to do something or a right to act

40

Beauchamp & Childress, p.104. The emphasis is added.
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Ibid., p. 293ff.

42

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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autonomously creates confusion. . .43
The authors then discuss the different concepts of privacy, borrowing from author Anita
Allen. These are described as:
. . .informational privacy, which biomedical ethics often emphasizes;
physical privacy, which focuses on persons and their personal spaces;
decisional privacy, which concerns personal choices; and proprietary
privacy, which highlights property interests in the human person.44
To this, Beauchamp and Childress add a fifth form of privacy, relational or associational
privacy,45 but they do not spend much time discussing it.
Unlike Beauchamp and Childress, Onora O’Neill discusses relational autonomy
and its conflict with the medical profession in her recent book, Autonomy and Trust in
Bioethics.46 Because O’Neill is influenced by continental philosophical thinking, her
concept of autonomy is very different from viewpoints expressed by American bioethicists.
Keep in mind that in the United States one major motivation for the movement promoting
autonomy was to escape what was considered an overreaching paternalism by the medical
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Beauchamp & Childress, p. 294. The emphasis is added.
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Onora O’Neill: Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
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profession.47

Physicians were specially trained, and in the opinion of the profession knew

best when it came to medical decisions. This is very obvious in the Code of Medical
Ethics written for and adopted by the medical profession in 1847.48 In contemporary
times, especially after World War II, many Americans were better educated and were
convinced that they were able to understand and define medical answers and make
decisions for themselves. O’Neill’s opinion, however, is that trust of the medical
professions is in disarray and that the contemporary ethical theory of autonomy fails to
understand this need for trust of the medical profession.. O’Neill sees this as a problem in
the misunderstanding of what autonomy means and should mean, arguing that autonomy
must be a relational and not an individualistic principle.
Of the four principles expressed by Beauchamp and Childress, O’Neill believes that
the concept of autonomy is misconstrued. While most Americans see autonomy as “a
matter of independence, or at least as a capacity for independent decisions and actions,”
O’Neill claims that autonomy must be regarded as relational:
. . . in speaking about obligations we shift from a way of thought that
is often viewed (both by protagonists and opponents) as individualistic,
to one that takes relationships between obligation bearers and right
holders, including institutionally defined relationships . . . We do not
know what our obligations are if we cannot specify to whom we
owe them.49
O’Neill bases her belief in the relational character of autonomy on the philosophy

47

Pence, p. 78. “During the early development of bioethics, this concept of individual
autonomy became very important in the patient rights movement.” (Emphasis added).
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O’Neill, p. 81.
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of Kant.50 This conception of autonomy is very different from that which is brought to
mind by Beauchamp and Childress, or by the court decisions in this country about the
rights of choice and privacy. However, this work by O’Neill is a classic example of how
little consolidation, even in terminology, exists in the field of medical ethics.51 It also
points out how the approach to medical ethics which has developed under the European
influence is grounded in different concepts attributed to some of the same basic terms.52
Beauchamp and Childress give expression to the traditional American view of
autonomy, as expressed in medical ethics in the United States. They trace the history of
this American concept of privacy and autonomy to Warren and Brandeis’ “celebrated
1890 article “The Right to Privacy”53 wherein it was argued that “a legal right to privacy
flows from fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property.” Beauchamp and Childress
mention that perhaps the right to privacy comes from “a cluster of other rights, from

50

O’Neill, p. 83. She states:
The advantages of grounding rights in obligations can be secured only
if good arguments for central human obligations can be found. . . In this
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which this right is derivative,” citing the work of Judith Thomson.54

After mentioning

other theories, however, Beauchamp and Childress conclude:
The primary justification, we suggest, resides in a third rationale, based
on the principle of respect for autonomy. We often respect persons by
respecting their autonomous wishes not to be observed, touched, or intruded
upon. On this account, rights of privacy are valid claims against unauthorized access that have their basis in the right to authorize or decline access.
These rights are justified by rights of autonomous choice that are correlative
to the obligations expressed in the principle of respect for autonomy. In this
respect, the justification of the right to privacy parallels the justification of
the right to give an informed consent that we developed in Chapter 3.55
It is also important to note that the medical concept of informed consent parallels
the United States Fourth Amendment Constitutional prohibitions against unlawful search
and seizure. When the Supreme Court of the United States expressed its idea of privacy as
a constitutional right, the idea, like that of the different kinds of autonomy intersected
many different subject matters and many different issues. That is why, even though issues
of autonomy can differ from those imitating other kinds of autonomous expression, the
issue of privacy covers it all. Therefore, there is a very strong argument, supported by
Beauchamp and Childress, that the medical right to autonomy parallels the rights to
privacy and liberty discussed in legal circles.. Goldman states:
For this reason the most fundamental right is the right to control the
course of one’s life, to make decisions crucial to it, including decisions
in life-or-death medical contexts.56
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Charles Sykes, in his book The End of Privacy, reminds us where the concept of
privacy or confidentiality began in the medical profession, namely, in the Hippocratic Oath
itself, dating from the fifth century B.C.E.:
What I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside
of the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself holding such things shameful
to be spoken about.57
Sykes continues with this thought and states, “If there is one area of life where most
Americans expect privacy, it is in their relationship with their doctors.” 58 And, indeed,
the medical profession today is caught in the very cross-hairs of dispute over this sort of
confidentiality and right of privacy, when Sykes reminds us that:
A short list of those who might have access to a medical file would
include HMOs, insurance companies, private and public databases,
pharmacists, hospital workers, and employers. Especially in managed
care, confidential medical information is shared with a startlingly wide
range of providers including insurers, pharmacists, state health organizations, researchers, employers, marketing firms, and pharmaceutical
companies. The Medical Information Bureau in Boston maintains files
on 15 million people who have applied for various kinds of insurance.59
Obviously, then, the medical profession has to be concerned with privacy.
There have been few decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States or other
state courts that have directly connected the concept of privacy in the medical field to that
of privacy in other lines of Supreme Court decisions. There have been a few exceptions,
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as Sykes notes:
But as to legal rights: “In the 1996 case Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme
Court went further toward protecting medical privacy than it had ever
gone before, declaring that any communications between a psychotherapists and patient are confidential and could not be subpoenaed or revealed
in an federal case.60
But, Sykes continues:
But what seems to be shocking when applied to the intimate secrets of
therapy is routine when it comes to general medical care. Unlike the
relationship between therapist and patient, the Supreme Court has never
recognized a similar privilege for medical doctors and their patients.61
However, the Supreme Court of the United States has entered the medical arena
in other important decisions that did not arise from privilege or confidentiality. The first
two of these were the cases of Griswold v. Connecticut in 1965, concerning the right to
obtain and distribute contraceptives, and Roe v. Wade, the case concerning the abortion
rights of women. In these cases, legal scholars and historians alike found a connection
between the medical concepts of autonomy and choice, and the legal concept of privacy
and liberty. N.E.H. Hull and Peter Charles Hoffer put it this way:
In the late 1960's, advocates of women’s legal right to abortions selected
the word “choice” to promote their cause. . .choice went hand in hand with
the concept of privacy, a legal right that was almost one hundred years old
by the time it was featured in the Roe opinions, but one that had only been
recently been applied to women’s reproductive experience.”62
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Thus we begin to see that with the Griswold decision in 1965, followed closely by Roe v.
Wade in 1973, the bioethical concepts of autonomy and the legal concepts of privacy and
liberty began to merge. This is obviously reflected in the philosophy of Beauchamp and
Childress as already mentioned. It is also the theory of Ellen Alderman and Caroline
Kennedy, who wrote in their book The Right to Privacy about this connection of the legal
and medical issues:
The Constitution has also been interpreted to protect another form of
privacy, the right to make decision involving family life and procreation, including
contraception and abortion. However, this form of privacy is
not explicitly set out in the Constitution, but is derived from the broader
concept of “liberty,” and is therefore somewhat harder to define and more
controversial. . .63
These authors give an illuminating view of the connection between these medical rights
and the legal rights of liberty. For instance, they state:
Constitutional protection of a woman’s decision to end a pregnancy is
based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
clause declares that no person will be denied “life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.” Beginning nearly a hundred years ago, the
Supreme Court interpreted “liberty” as encompassing certain fundamental
rights not specifically listed in the Bill of Rights. Giving substance to the
term “liberty” in this way is known as “substantive due process.” In this
view, rights “deeply rooted in this Nations’s history and tradition” and
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty for
justice would exist if they were sacrificed,”are protected.64
Additionally, In the Griswold case Justice William O. Douglas wrote that “We deal
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with a right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”65 Alderman and Kennedy put it this
way:
Justice Douglas pointed out that many rights which are not specifically
mentioned in the Constitution but are derived from specific provisions have
long been protected by the Court. For example, freedom of association is
an extension of the guarantees of freedom of speech and assembly. Justice
Douglas found that the spirit, structure, and specific provisions of the Bill
of Rights created “zones of privacy” which are broad enough to protect
aspects of personal and family life . . .66
Later, when the abortion decision of Roe v. Wade was threatened by other case decisions
before the United States Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun, who had authored the opinion
for the Court in Roe v. Wade, wrote:
In a Nation that cherishes liberty, the ability of a woman to control the
biological operation of her body. . . must fall within that limited sphere
of individual autonomy that lies beyond the will or power of any transient
majority. . .This Court stands as the ultimate guarantor of that zone of
privacy, regardless of the bitter disputes to which our decision may give rise. . .67
Finally, Alderman and Kennedy find that the “autonomy” of medical decisions and
the “liberty” and “privacy” of legal decisions are best tied together by the words of Justice
Sandra Day O’Conner in her written opinion in the Casey decision. They state:
Justice O’Connor then defended substantive due process and, in turn,
the right to privacy. She concluded that the Court was not limited by
practices current at the time the Bill of Rights was written or the Fourteenth Amendment adopted. Rather, as it had concluded in Griswold
and Roe, the Court found that its responsibility was to balance individual liberty against the demands of organized society through an exercise
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of reasoned judgment. “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is
a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter. . . At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the state,” the Court declared.68
So, according to this distinguished Justice of the Supreme Court, courts have a
duty to “balance individual liberty against the demands of society through an exercise of
reasoned judgment.” This sounds very much like the balancing of Beauchamp and
Childress’ four major principles when conflicts arise, or like the process of reflective
equilibrium theorized by philosopher John Rawls and adopted by Beauchamp and
Childress as the means by which the medical profession should balance the conflicts
between the different theories of medical ethics. It is also obvious from this review that
the constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court of the United States, and, by other
courts, of our legal rights of liberty and privacy have used language very similar to that
used in the examination of the concept of autonomy by those who speak of issues in
medical ethics.
Thus, on the day that the Casey decision was handed down in 1992, in a very
unusual departure from the normal practice of the court, Justice Anthony Kennedy
read aloud to the Court’s audience that
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
68
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-26-

the Fourteenth Amendment. . . 69
Additionally, Garrow put it this way:
Undoubtedly the most powerful and eloquent section of the [Casey]
opinion was the ensuing discussion of Roe v. Wade and stare decisis
that had been crafted by [Justice] David Souter:
“For two decades of economic and social developments, people
have organized intimate relationships and made choices that define
their views of themselves and their places in society, in reliance on the
availability of abortion in the event that contraception should fail. The
ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives . . .An entire generation has come of age free to assume
Roe’s concept of liberty or personal autonomy has left Roe’s central
holding as a doctrinal remnant. . .”70
Finally, a quote from Yale’s Harold Lasswell:
The presumption in favor of privacy follows from our respect for
freedom of choice for autonomy, for self-direction on the part of
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everyone.71
From all of the above, it is therefore one of the conclusions of this thesis that the
bioethicist’s concept of autonomy, with respect to both information and decisions, and
the legal notions of liberty and privacy derive from the same historical context and are
basically the same philosophical concept.72 In fact, after the Roe v. Wade decision,
Garrow states:
Any number of legal writers would go on to make the point that some
alternative term or concept other than “privacy,” such as either “autonomy”
or simply “liberty,” ought to be frankly acknowledged as the substantive
core of what was at issue in Roe. . . 73
For this reason, this thesis will trace the development of this constitutional right
established by the Supreme Court of the United States in earlier cases and in Roe v.
Wade. It will follow its extension through other major decisions of the that Court and
other courts in this country. However, such a path will conclude with the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in the Washington/Vacco decision in 1997. As if Alderman
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and Kennedy could foresee the issue when they published The Right to Privacy, they
concluded the introduction to the section of their book on “Privacy and the Self” with
these words:
In this decade, the looming privacy battle has to do with decisions at the
end of life–the right to refuse medical treatment, the right to die, the right
to assisted suicide. Can a competent person refuse medical treatment in
order to end his life? Can people seek help in hastening their deaths? If
they are incompetent, who decides for them . . . From the beginning of life
to its end, the right to privacy often protects our most fundamental decisions.
But courts struggle to balance new technology and old values, societal interests
and individual freedom.74
As we will see, the Washington/Vacco decision answered those questions and
defined the limits, for now, of our constitutional right of privacy. By the United States
Supreme Court’s declaration in this case, such a right does not extend to physicianassisted suicide. To understand how the Supreme Court of the United States reached this
decision in the wake of the Griswold and Roe v. Wade constitutional interpretations, we
will have to carefully examine the history of these cases.
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CHAPTER THREE:
THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN ROE V. WADE:
Roe v. Wade and its companion cases remain the most
divisive and controversial judicial decisions of the twentieth
century. . . . Roe was a watershed event in American women’s
history, coming at a time when feminism had developed but not
yet established the legal basis for its reform program. . .75
[1] Background:
Americans love the law.
Some argue that there are more lawyers per capita in the United States than in any
country on the face of the earth. It appears to be the appeal of democratic and
representational legislation that set this standard of belief in the law. Even though it is, by
far, not a perfect system, it is believed by Americans to be a better system than exists
elsewhere. Whether this is still true or not, with the influence of money and media, we still
believe that the representatives we elect to the process that creates the law represents the
will of the people. Americans strongly believe that they can, through appropriate action,
involve themselves in changing the system by involvement in changing the law. Further,
we have this amazing and somewhat perplexing belief in the rule of law, a fact that
continues to surprise the rest of the free world. An excellent example of this belief was
Vice President Gore’s quiet resolve to follow the ruling of the United States Supreme
Court that effectively ended the debate as to who had won the presidential race in the year
2000. This was despite the fact that Gore, not Bush, had won the majority of votes cast.
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The Supreme Court made a ruling, and the election was over.
Modern Americans hang on the resolution offered by the Supreme Court of the
United States to those issues that confront us in the legal, moral and ethical realm almost
with the dependency of religious fervor.76 Nothing else was able to turn back the Jim
Crow legislation that followed the Civil War like Brown v. The Board of Education.77
Whether it is the resolution of voting rights, conflicts between the states, or the very
essence of our freedom under the Bill of Rights, there is nowhere else in the world where
the people of a nation surrender quite so completely to the dictates of the supremacy of
judicial law.78
This is the very essence of the Supreme Court of the United States. The legislative
power enacts the law, the executive branch enforces it, but the Supreme Court interprets
the Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States relates what the Constitution
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means, what it allows, and whether or not laws passed by the Congress of the United
States or any individual state’s legislature conflict with the underlying basic foundation of
our government, the Constitution of the United States of America. In so doing, the
Supreme Court of the United States has become the final and most probative force in
telling us what the Constitution allows.
What a compelling force! Can we rely on this source of power to set national
policies that will effect ethical and moral norms on some subjects of medical ethics? Can
the Supreme Court of the United States become the final and most authoritative force to
tell us what is ethically right or wrong concerning these issues? Can this power of judicial
review be a source for a foundation on some issues of ethics generally, but more
specifically, a source for a resolution of the quandary we find ourselves facing in the field
of medical ethics concerning the issues of autonomy and privacy?
We need such answers in medical ethics. In many circumstances the power of law
and judicial interpretation can react to the fast-paced innovation that is going on in the
world today better than any alternative. Technology virtually rips along, destroying
tradition and thousands of years of moral center in its wake. Because we wish to live
longer, healthier lives, a major amount of technological innovation is directed at medical
care and research, forcing us to confront the battleground of ethical challenge in today’s
world: genetic engineering, stem cell research, and a multitude of other issues such as
technology that is vastly expensive, and yet a medical practice that sets a standard of care
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that it is wiping out all reserves of ability to pay for it.79
Hospital ethics committees and institutional review boards can do some of this
work. However, they do not have the force and effect of law. They cannot establish
rights nor can they by themselves enforce obligations nor the duties of those involved
except on a limited and local scale. Additionally, there is an ethics committee for every
hospital and many different types of institutional review boards. Setting the norm or
medical ethical agenda should not be done by the very entity that needs the direction and
rules to follow. Consider the research horrors of the past, not only in Nazi Germany but
in this country when the rules were left up to those doing the medical research. These
agencies will have to use standards and codes of ethics that are developed elsewhere.
These committees and boards also do not have authority outside of their setting.80 Even
as powerful as the American Medical Association is in promulgating opinions and ethical
policies, it does not speak for all medical professionals but only its own members. Even
then the AMA has not been consistent in the interpretation and implementation of its own
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policies.81
Only state and federal governments can make these decisions with legal force or
rule of law. Legal force, and the rule of law, is not only needed, it is required by our
constitutional system of federal, state and local government. Even though history teaches
that moral force alone can succeed, it is usually backed by religious doctrine, which has
witnessed extremes such as making murderers out of those claiming to uphold the
sacredness of life. Our system also requires a separation of moral authority backed by
religion from the legal implementation of our governing authority. Additionally, as just
emphasized, individual states and local government entities cannot set up such rules and
policies of medical ethics with any national uniformity or universality. If we are going to
wish for a policy of medical ethics that is fair, and affects all equally, it will have to be
established by the national government.
Congress has attempted this, with the FDA and the Department of Health and
Human Services’ review and enforcement of research and medical practices. Even though
this process has accomplished a great deal of good, the procedure and its implementation
has suffered under the weight of politics and interference from those with monied
interests.82 If we are to look to the government of the United States for such rule making
81
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policies and guidelines established by the AMA just on the subject of physician-assisted
suicide. A careful review of these written policies and other rules established by the
AMA will show a basic inconsistency. A fine example is the wording that “patient
autonomy is to be respected” in the same rule that denies access to physician-assisted
suicide.
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Consider today’s headlines concerning the pharmaceutical product Vioxx and other
Cox2 inhibitors, which many claim were allowed by the FDA despite plenty of warnings
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and norm-setting, then we would be better off with the Supreme Court’s review of that
basic instrument, that basic foundation of all of our government, the Constitution of the
United States. Only the Supreme Court of the United States has such power to review
and interpret this legal document. In addition, would it not be best to look for
foundational support for ethical systems within the very legal foundation of our society?
Could this hope of some national policy stream into the content of philosophical
ethics? Can philosophers and bioethicists look to the force of judicial interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States to supply some guidance in the formation of ethical
theory on the limited subject of privacy?

[2] The Decision:
As a husband and as a father of a daughter,
I am moved by. . .what Roe truly means–that our
most private decisions can be made behind the
closed doors of our homes, with our families, and
in private conversations with our hearts. . .
President Bill Clinton83
It is still somewhat difficult for us to understand the importance of Roe v. Wade.
This decision dates back to 1973 and is tossed about in legal discussion, and even in the

that the medicines were not safe. But then, articles in the press allege that Merck, the
manufacturer of Vioxx, spends more on publicity and lobbying efforts than the Pepisco
Corporation. The same private interests of money and politics have also corrupted the
review of such issues by the Supreme Court of the United States, as this thesis will
concludes.
83

This quote by the former President appears on the cover of Sarah Weddington’s book,
A Question of Choice.
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discussion of medical ethics, as “the abortion case.” While it clearly focused on abortion
and made paramount decisions for the legality of that medical procedure, Roe v. Wade is
not merely an abortion case. Fundamentally, and, in review of the order of the opinion’s
declarations, this Supreme Court decision is about freedom and personal liberty.
Following a long history of cases attempting to establish what is basically referred
to as the Penumbra of the Bill of Rights, those rights which are incorporated by essence,
but not specifically set out in the Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States
declared in this case that we, as Americans, have a constitutional right of privacy.
However, not everyone agrees that there is even such a thing as a Constitutional right of
privacy. For instance, Charles J. Sykes has stated:
The word “privacy” does not appear in the U.S. Constitution, an omission
that has led some conservative critics to question whether there is any
constitutional right to privacy. Even as the Court explicitly recognized the
right of privacy in the 1960s, prominent jurists insisted that the court was
simply manufacturing the right out of whole legal cloth. “I like my privacy
as well as the next one,” wrote Justice HugoBlack, “but I am nevertheless
compelled to admit that the government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.” Similarly, Justice Potter
Stewart insisted, “I can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of
Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case before decided
by this Court.”84
Regardless of these attitudes, the Supreme Court of the United States undertook
an examination of these “privacy rights” in Roe v. Wade. This case came to the United
States Supreme Court as a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
84

Sykes, p. 82. The quotations from the justices are drawn from Ellen Alderman and
Caroline Kennedy: The Right to Privacy (New York: Vintage Books, 1997), p. 58.
Despite what Sykes calls “these skeptics,” the rights of privacy existing in English
common law, the colonies, and the laws of the United States does exist. See this
discussion beginning on p. 83 of Sykes.
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Texas criminal abortion statute. The local Federal District Court ruled by way of
declaratory judgment that Texas law violated Roe’s rights according to the 9th and 14th
Amendments to the United States Constitution. The case came to the United States
Supreme Court directly because the issue appealed concerned injunctive relief.85 The
actual ruling of the Court was that the Texas law violated the 14th Amendment’s Due
Process Clause based on the finding that this proposed state action was prohibited by the
right of privacy. The fact that this included a woman’s qualified right to terminate her
pregnancy, even at the expense of the fetus, was a secondary conclusion with respect to
this important legal right.86 This is also exactly what the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals said in its opinion striking down the State of Washington’s statutes in the
85

See pp. 4-5 of Roe v. Wade as to these facts contained in the opinion. There is a
tremendous body of discussion in legal circles about what is not in the opinion. Roe is
not really the name of the plaintiff, but a derivative of the use “Jane Doe” to keep her
identity secret. Her name was actually Norma McCorvey. There are theories that the
case, especially the injunctive relief, was staged in order to get the case quickly to the
United States Supreme Court. One of the most interesting things about the decision
historically is that the woman who was Roe now publically speaks out against abortion
rights. See Faux, pp. 327-28. McCorvey, Faux relates, now describes herself “as the
most famous cleaning woman in America.”
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Ibid. See the 3rd Head Note of the opinion (the first two deal only with standing issues).
The Court immediately set out the Rule of Law: “State criminal abortion laws, like those
involved here. . .violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
protects against state action the right to privacy. . .” The Court goes on to establish that
this “includes a woman’s qualified right to terminate her pregnancy.” By the very
wording of the opinion, Justice Blackmun meant this ruling to be about more than
abortion rights and about more than just Texas law. Also see Sarah Weddington’s
comments on receiving word of the Court’s opinion in Roe v. Wade, p. 161 of Question
of Choice:
I checked off the significant points: There is a constitutional right of
privacy; pregnancy is fundamental; the State had no compelling reason
to prohibit abortion to the extent the anti-abortion laws had provided.
The Texas laws were unconstitutional. . .
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underlying decision that became the Washington/Vacco case before the United States
Supreme Court.87
The “Penumbra” of the Bill of Rights had been discussed by the Supreme Court of
the United States in a long line of cases.88 In these cases, the Court has recognized that a
right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution of the United States. The cases established this right in various
places within the Constitution, from the 1st, 4th, 5th, 9th, and 14th Amendments to the
“Penumbra of the Bill of Rights.” However, those earlier opinions were focused on
particular freedoms, and focused on different places in the United States Constitution for
their support. The Supreme Court of the United States was concerned that these prior
decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty fall under this protection of privacy. However,
the right had previously been extended to activities relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing and education by these earlier cases.
When the Supreme Court of the United States took up the case of Roe v. Wade
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the opinion for the Court, carefully reviewed all this prior
case history in a way that no previous opinion had quite consolidated in one location.
The opinion followed the individual issues with the previous rulings, showing on what
grounds and in what set of facts the right to privacy had previously been extended.
history, instead of isolating Roe v. Wade as just an abortion case, clearly shows the
87

See the discussion on p. 76 of this text.
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See notes 22 and 84.
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This

development of the rule of law through Supreme Court decisions based on this right of
privacy beginning in 1891. This decision, while extending the right of privacy to the
medical procedure of abortion, more importantly stands as the best clarification of this
valid constitutional right.89 In the previous cases the Court examined and formed their
opinions based on a right of privacy or zone of protection of privacy. However, in the Roe
v. Wade decision Justice Blackmun immediately reviewed whether the state laws in those
areas violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Blackmun wrote that this
Amendment to the United States Constitution legally invalidates any state law that in any
way violates this Constitutional right of privacy. Even though nine jurists sit on the
Supreme Court, only two justices dissented in this landmark case. Justice White filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist joined. Rehnquist filed his own dissent as well.90
After two procedural points, the Blackmun’s opinion noted the importance of the
issue before the bench. The states, declared the opinion, cannot regulate the issue of a
women’s right to abortion “without regard to the stage of her pregnancy and other
interests involved” without violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
89

Both Weddington in Question of Choice and Sykes in The End of Privacy adopt this
way of viewing the importance of the decision in Roe v. Wade throughout their books.
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I am using the text of the opinion found at FindLaw.com. This information is provided
on p. 2 of the opinion. It is historically important to note the Rehnquist dissent, in that we
will see his influence in altering the importance of the Roe v. Wade decision as early as
the Cruzan opinion. This factor greatly increased when the United States Supreme Court
reached its decision in Robert P. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania et. al., 91 U.S. 744, 91 U.S. 902 (1992), which was a definitive opinion of
the court on abortion regulation by the states. This case will hereinafter be referred to as
Casey. Rehnquist’s theory on this issue becomes fully clear in the Washington/Vacco
decisions, which turn the regulation of rights concerning physician-assisted suicide back to
the individual states completely.
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Amendment “which protects against state action the right to privacy.”91 Justice Blackmun
wrote, “Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional measurement, free of
emotion and of predilection.”92 The appellant’s had brought their appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States directly based on the concept of privacy which had been
established by the Supreme Court by the concept of liberty in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and by the “personal, marital, familial, and sexual privacy said
to be protected by the Bill of Rights or its Penumbras.93

While the opinion did not

specifically characterize these rights as extending to a medical right of privacy involving
the concepts of medical autonomy, Roe v. Wade, like its predecessor cases in the field of
contraceptive rights, did involve the medical arena. In addition, the Supreme Court of the
United States had questioned whether or not this right of privacy would extend to
abortion when hearing oral arguments in the Griswold case.94
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Roe v. Wade. See head note three on p. 2 of the opinion, as well as the body of the
opinion.
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Ibid., p. 3.
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Ibid., p. 8. The court specifically cites Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) at this specific point. Faux, in her book
Roe v. Wade, states the importance of Griswold:
. . . the breakthrough in Griswold had not been that the decision had
“created” a right of privacy, as critics carpingly claimed, but rather
that it had give a cherished, respected value, privacy, a name.
See p. 308. The emphasis is added.
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Hull & Hoffer p. 87. They state:
Near the end of the oral argument in Griswold when Emerson [one of the
attorneys] was using his rebuttal time, Justice Black asked a question that
was on more than one of the justices’ minds, to judge from Warren’s and
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For the next fifteen or so pages of the Roe v. Wade opinion Blackmun took up the
history of the issue of abortion, beginning with matters as old as the Hippocratic Oath and
how this subject had been treated by the common and statutory law. However, the
opinion then took up the specific issue of privacy, noting that while the Constitution does
not expressly mention this concept,
In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific
R. Co. V. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized
that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of
privacy, does exist under the Constitution.95
Roe v. Wade settled the issue between the states that were in conflict about legalized
abortion by making the surgical procedure legal in some circumstances.96
The force and rule of law is not perfect: approximately one half of the United
States population still debates whether or not the practice of abortion is ethical. As
previously mentioned, some detest the legality of the procedure to the point that they are
willing to murder the doctors who perform the procedure. The decision, however, created
a legal precedent in this country people in this country have, more or less, followed the
dictates of the decision that a woman has a right to this medical choice despite personal
feelings otherwise, particularly emphasizing a woman’s ability to make medical choices

Stewart’s later remarks. “Would your argument. . . relating to privacy,
invalidate all laws that punish people for bringing about abortion. . .”
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Roe v. Wade, p.15. It is at this point that the opinion fully describes the history of
cases which illustrate this point, carefully pointing out all of the specific and numerous
foundations for this right to be found through the Constitution of the United States.
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While the actual case arose out of the state of Texas, briefs of amici curiae were filed by
the Attorney Generals of Arizona, Connecticut, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Utah as well as
many professional associations and interest groups. See p. 3 of the Roe v. Wade opinion.
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about her own body.97

This case represents a perfect example of how, over time, a legal

ruling has affected a population’s ethical beliefs. The Roe v. Wade decision appears, over
time, to have given guidance to what our ethical belief should be on the issue of abortion.
However, clearly shown in the Roe v. Wade decision, and many other Supreme
Court of the United States’ decisions, is the acknowledgment that some state regulation in
areas protected by the right of privacy is appropriate. A state may properly assert
important interests in “safeguarding health, or in maintaining medical standards,” but the
sate must have “compelling state interests” to do so. In any case, no prior decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States had quite so clearly stated the right of privacy,
especially in its extension to the right to make medical decisions.98 After this decision,
many courts and legal scholars in the United States no longer doubted that the
constitutional right of privacy existed. However, some legal opinions continue to
disagree until this day.

97

Many would disagree with this statement. However, the last two presidential elections,
in which abortion rights were a key division point between the two major political parties,
show quite clearly that the country is almost evenly divided on this issue. People who
think that this is not a vast change in favor of abortion since 1973 need to recall that only
New York and a few other states had legalized abortion prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Roe v. Wade. The Court’s action in legalizing it throughout the country had
the effect that the passage of law always does in highly disputed areas: Americans tend to
follow the law. Prohibition was another such issue. However, no one would say today
that fewer people are in favor of legal alcohol than they were when prohibition was
overturned. Legality always seems to bring acceptance, just as I think it will in the future
on the gay marriage issue or when marijuana is finally legalized.
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See Weddington’s conclusions on this issue in Question of Choice. Also, in a
discussion on the rights of privacy, Sykes highlights the decision of Roe v. Wade
as the “high water mark” of privacy decisions in this country. In fact, Sykes’s discussion
leading up to Roe v. Wade is entitled “Privacy’s High Watermark.” ( p. 87).
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The greatest voice of discontent concerning Roe v. Wade’s declaration of a
fundamental Constitutional right has to be that of Chief Justice Rehnquist. This can be
seen in many opinions, but perhaps is best illustrated in the dissent Justice Rehnquist filed
in the Casey decision.99 Other legal scholars have denied that such a right of privacy even
exists, such as jurist Robert H. Bork, formerly a member of the U.S. 2nd Circuit Court of
Appeals, who was denied his nomination to the United States Supreme Court by a
Congress concerned about his conservative views on the interpretation of the United
States Constitution.100
While it can be regulated, the right of privacy found in other Supreme Court
decisions before Roe v. Wade clearly covered marriage rights, contraception, family
99

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania, et., al., v. Robert P. Casey, et., al.,
etc. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). There were actually two cases heard in conjunction. I am using
the text of the opinion found at the Legal Information Institute which is available on the
web at http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct, This case will be hereinafter referred to as
Casey. This issue of the Casey dissent is discussed in detail beginning later in this text.
100

Bork, and others, believe that only explicitly stated rights exist under the United States
Constitution, denying interpretations from the “Penumbra” of the Bill of Rights or other
sources. Sykes covers this in End of Privacy on p. 85, as follows:
For conservative critics like Judge Robert Bork, the discovery (he would
say invention) of a constitutional right to privacy by the Supreme Court
was an egregious example of the imperial judiciary writing its own preconceptions into law.
David Garrow quotes Patrick Moynihan as revealing his decision to vote against Bork
when Bork was nominated for the United States Supreme Court:
. . . it is his restricted vision of privacy which troubles me the most.
I cannot vote for a jurist who simply cannot find in the Constitution
a general right of privacy. . .[for such a right] is a fundamental protection for the individual and the family against unwarranted state intrusion.
Its importance is such that I cannot support anyone for a Supreme Court
appointment who would not recognize it.
Many others in the Senate felt the same, obviously. Such was the power of Griswold and
Roe v.Wade.
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relationships, child rearing, and education. After this landmark decision, the right of
privacy had been extended to that of a person having the right to make determinations
about the medical choices one faces concerning one’s own body. Thus the constitutional
right of privacy had perfectly melded, by this opinion, with the medical profession’s
growth and determination of the patient’s right of autonomy. Justice Blackmun
specifically referred to this connection in the body of the opinion. He was specifically
concerned that abortion be viewed as a “medical procedure.”101 After a discussion of the
horrors involved with the history of abortion, and perhaps the state’s interest in protection
of a woman from “submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious jeopardy,”
Blackmun declared that “Modern medical techniques have altered this situation,”102
meaning that modern abortion did not threaten women with death any more than, as the
statistics show, giving birth threatens women’s lives. He concluded:
Consequently, any interest of the State in protecting the woman from
an inherently hazardous procedure, except when it would be equally
dangerous for her to forgo it, has largely disappeared. Of course,
important state interests in the areas of health and medical standards
do remain.103
This feeling was further solidified in the opinion’s conclusion:
We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy includes
the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified and
must be considered against important state interests in regulation.104
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Roe v. Wade, p.14.
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Ibid., p. 16.
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In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated:
The Court’s opinion brings to the decision of this troubling question
both extensive historical fact and a wealth of legal scholarship. While
the opinion thus commands my respect, I find myself nonetheless in
fundamental disagreement with those parts of it that invalidate the
Texas statute in question, and therefore dissent.105
Rehnquist was bothered not only by the standing of Roe, and whether she was really
pregnant at the time, especially within the first trimester that by the opinion would remain
unregulated. He was also incensed at the conclusion of the Blackmun’s opinion that a
“right of privacy” was involved in this case:
Even if there were a plaintiff in this case capable of litigating the issue
which the Court decides, I would reach a conclusion opposite to that
reached by the Court. I have difficulty in concluding, as the Court does,
that the right of “privacy” is involved in this case . . .A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is not “private” in the ordinary usage
of that word. Nor is the “privacy” that the Court finds here even a distant
relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth
Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy.106
Rehnquist stated that he would have been more supportive if the Court had talked
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Roe v. Wade, pp. 31-32.
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Ibid., p. 32. This is not terribly surprising. Hull & Hoffer point out (p. 166) that
Rehnquist is “a more consistent and ideologically committed conservative than Powell,”
and recites that while a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson in the
1952 term, Rehnquist wrote a memo on Brown v. Board of Education “urging that the
Court not reject the older separate but equal doctrine in favor of desegregation of the
public schools.” Hull & Hoffer also note that our present Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court “served in the Department of Justice in the first Nixon
administration advocating widespread wiretapping of suspected criminals without prior
court orders and preventive detention of suspected criminals without arraignment. He
opposed the right to counsel and other Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment decisions of
the Warren Court.” There is no question where Rehnquist will stand should opposition to
The Patriot Act ever come before the Court.
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about interests of “liberty” rather than those of privacy. Pointing out that laws against
abortion existed in the several states as the 14th Amendment was being passed, Rehnquist
stated that “To reach its result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of
the Fourteenth Amendment a right that was apparently completely unknown to the
drafters of the Amendment.”107 He concluded:
There apparently was no question concerning the validity of this provision
or of any of the other state statutes when the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted. The only conclusion possible from this history is that the drafters
did not intend to have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States
the power to legislate with respect to this matter [abortion].108
It is obvious that one of Rehnquist’s objections in this dissenting opinion is
historical: abortion was already illegal in some states that passed the 14th Amendment, and
there was an absence of discussion at that time that this Amendment would overturn those
laws. However, the dissent makes clear that Rehnquist’s opinion also differs from the
Blackmun opinion in that the Court’s decision brings constitutional law clearly within the
parameters of the medical profession’s belief in the autonomy of a patient making medical
decisions. Of course, dissents have no legal bearing on the specific issue then before the
Court. In any case, Rehnquist was not alone. William Van Alstyne, a well-known legal
analyst at the time, was eventually very harsh in his criticism of the Roe v. Wade decision,
which he claimed was:
. . . an aberration of judicial legislation . . .[Griswold] did not imply Roe,
or anything even close . . . there is not such thing. . .as a personal, freestanding, fundamental right embedded in the Constitution of the United
107
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States to kill gestating life. Roe v. Wade, in suggesting otherwise, proceeded on an assumption not derived or derivable from Griswold v.
Connecticut, from any previous case, or indeed, from any constitutional
clause. It was rather judicial legislation.109
Regardless of these dissents, other legal scholars immediately saw things
differently:
The holding in Roe is, nonetheless, far more solid than it at first appears,
for it is fully consistent with, and reflects a groping toward, principles that
are justified in both reason and precedent even if these principles were
never adequately articulated by the opinion of the Court.110
The acceptance of the Roe v. Wade decision by the legal, medical and press community
was swift, and, surprisingly, tremendously in favor of the Court’s decision. David Garrow
recalls the facts:
Editorially, the nation’s newspapers reacted to Roe and Doe with overwhelming praise. The New York Times welcomed the Blackmun opinion
as “a major contribution to the preservation of individual liberties”
and said that they offered “a sound foundation for final and reasonable
resolution” of the abortion debate. “Nothing in the Court’s approach,”
the Times added, “ought to give affront to persons who oppose all abortions for reasons of religion or individual convictions.” The Washington
Post termed the decisions “wise and sound,” and the Los Angeles Times
stated that they were “sensible” as well as both legally and historically
“persuasive.” The Boston Globe said it was “deeply gladdened” by the
outcome, and the Wall Street Journal, while expressing “certain reservations,” said that overall the Court had “struck a reasonable balance on
an exceedingly difficult question.” The Philadelphia Inquirer praised
109

Garrow, p. 613. On the same page, Garrow points out that future Supreme Court
of the United States Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg claimed that Roe v. Wade was faulty in
that “the Court ventured too far in the change it ordered and presented an incomplete
justification for its action.” This was surprising in that Ginsburg was head of the
American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project in 1973, the year Roe v. Wade
was decided.
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Philip P. Heymann and Douglas E. Barzelay: “The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade
and its Critics,” Boston University Law Review, 53 (May 1973): pp. 765-784.
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Blackmun’s “admirable reasoned decision,” and the Pittsburgh PostGazette said that the Court had acted with “compassion and intelligence.”
The Atlanta Constitution characterized the result as “realistic and appropriate,” and the Raleigh News and Observer stated that the decision
should be “praised” for “upholding our traditional concept of personal
freedom.” The Arkansas Democrat asserted that the United States was
“doubly blessed that this matter was settled by the court rather than by
legislation,” and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch said the Court’s action was
“remarkable for its common sense, its humaneness and most of all for
its affirmation of an individual’s right to privacy.” Within Texas, the
Houston Chronicle commended the judgment as “sound” and the San
Antonio Light concluded that “The ruling is not perfect, but it was as
close to it as humanly possible.”111
Therefore it appeared, by this decision in 1973, that the Supreme Court of the
United States had set a standard for medical decisions: one had the right to make medical
decisions that affected one’s own body, based on a history of constitutional interpretation
that was found in the right of privacy. The overwhelming fact arising out of the Roe v.
Wade decision was that this was a ruling of national scope in its importance. Not just
Texas was affected: the ruling of this decision made clear that any state interference in the
first trimester of pregnancy was going to be strictly curtailed, and it was not long before
the very idea of privacy in the making of medical choices under the Roe v. Wade decision
was extending to other types of medical choices and circumstances by other courts. But, a
word of caution is needed, best expressed by Charles Sykes:
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Garrow, pp. 605-606. Garrow also states:
“Out of some 33,000 doctors who responded to a questionnaire distributed by Modern Medicine magazine, however, more than 64
percent voiced approval of the Roe and Doe decisions . . . Several
weeks later, a nationwide Harris Poll found that 52 percent of respondents favored the Supreme Court decision, with 41 percent
registering disagreement and 7 percent saying they were unsure.”
( p. 607, emphasis added). Other factors of the case’s importance are revealed on
p. 608.
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Unfortunately for privacy, it has never quite been able to shake free
of the shadow of those “emanations” and “penumbras,” or from the
suspicion that they were simply covers for what Bork called the
“privatization of morality.” From Griswold to Roe v. Wade, the right
to privacy would be entangled in the politics of sexuality, contraceptives, and abortion. Inevitably, it was implicated in the cultural division
in American society. For Bork, the Court’s creation of a right to
privacy “has little to do with privacy but a great deal to do with the
freedom of the individual from moral regulation.112
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Sykes, p. 87. Sykes also states:
Critics like Bork argued that there could be no right of privacy because
none is specified in the Constitution . . .Bork gives relatively short shrift
in his own writings to the “natural law,” but his disdain for the idea of
natural rights seems to lead him toward a positivistic approach to the
law. Unless a right is granted in print, it does not exist, or is at least not
enforceable in the constitutional system. Indeed, Bork seems unable to
find constitutional protection for the right to procreate because it is not
specified in the document. Although Bork takes a strict view of the
Constitution itself, he seems to suggest a rather expansive view of what
the government is permitted to do.
It is important to note that Bork’s views were strongly criticized and his nomination to the
United States Supreme Court ended in failure. As Sykes concludes, as do many others:
The Constitution was not designed to exhaustively define the rights of
its citizens. In particular, the Ninth Amendment states: ‘The enumeration
in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.’
( Sykes, pp. 86-87). It was the Ninth Amendment that was referred to by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in denying the Texas abortion statute before the case reached the
United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. ( Sykes, p. 88). Sykes also has a lengthy
discussion concerning the right of privacy as developed in America’s law of torts. ( p. 91).
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CHAPTER FOUR:
A NATIONAL POLICY OF AUTONOMY IN MEDICAL CHOICES?
IN RE QUINLAN AND SUBSEQUENT CASES:
Following the decision of Roe v. Wade by the United States Supreme Court in
1973, controversy swept across the nation. The fight had begun which became known as
“the right to life” entities against those who had survived the women’s liberation
movement of the sixties, those that were “pro choice.” To many people, Roe v. Wade
was a conclusive victory for liberty, privacy, and in the medical realm, autonomy.113
It was this controversy, and an investigation into just what this landmark decision
meant, that came before the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976. The case was known as
In Re Quinlan.114 However, the issue was not that of abortion. Rather, Karen Quinlan
had fallen into what became a persistent vegetative state [known as PVS] in March of
113

Sarah Weddington stated in Question of Choice (p. 327):
Roe v. Wade became the law of the land and a national icon; the Court
[the Supreme Court of the United States] took no further action on
pending [abortion] cases. The rulings affected the laws in forty-four
states, thirty-one of them with statutes similar to Georgia’s [a Georgia
case was argued in close proximity to Roe].
The emphasis is added. For additional comments on the effect of Roe v. Wade, see
Marian Faux’s discussion in Roe v. Wade: The Untold Story of the Landmark Supreme
Court Decision That Made Abortion Legal: (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2001), p.
315. One of Faux’s most illuminating points is that the Supreme Court of the United
States has reportedly received more mail “45,000 letters at last count, than any case it
had ever handed down.”
Also, See footnote 12. In addition, I was in law school at the University of
Tennessee from 1977 until 1980. I took Constitutional Law from a professor who had
helped authored the 25th Amendment to the Constitution. There was little doubt in his
mind that Roe v. Wade was the greatest accomplishment of extending personal rights
since the passage of the 14th Amendment.
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1975 after allegedly drinking alcohol and taking various medications. Karen never
returned to consciousness, and the issue became that of whether or not her father could
have her removed from the ventilator that kept her breathing. The physician in charge of
Karen’s care felt, that, since Ms. Quinlan was an adult,115 he could not take instructions
from anyone other than his patient, and certainly not from her parents after she had
reached legal majority. Her father then petitioned the correct court of jurisdiction to be
appointed her legal guardian for the “express purpose of either authorizing the admitting
physician to withdraw ‘all extraordinary procedures for sustaining [his] daughter’s vital
processes’ or, if this physician continued to feel that he could not do this in good
conscience, to transfer her care to another physician who would do so.”116 Because of
this, the issue before the court was not only that of autonomy, the choice and privacy of a
patient with a pending medical patient, but also the issue of whether a designated person
with legal authority could make such choices for a medical patient.
The issue reached the New Jersey Supreme Court on appeal. Ultimately, the court
ruled that as long as an ethics committee agreed with the diagnosis that Karen was
definitely in a persistent vegetative state, she could be removed from the respirator.117
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Ms. Quinlan had turned twenty-two in March of 1975. In New Jersey, the age of legal
majority is twenty one.
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Document CD ROM 0560, Medical Ethics 546, Dr. Glenn Graber, The University of
Tennessee Inter-Campus Graduate Program in Medical Ethics. Also, see pp. 2-13 of
the New Jersey Supreme Court opinion.
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It is important to note that the respirator and modern ventilator are acquisitions of
medical technology that have only existed since the early 1960's. These medical tools,
along with the nasogastric feeding tube technology, enabled life support for comatose and
PVS patients where in earlier times the patients would have simply died for lack of
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Unfortunately, Karen did not die when the respirator was removed, but remained in a
coma for an additional nine years, receiving hydration and nutrition by means of the
nasogastric feeding tube. She finally died of respiratory failure associated with pneumonia
when a decision was made not to administer antibiotics.
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention a right of privacy,
Supreme Court decisions have recognized that a right of privacy is guaranteed under the Constitution. The court has interdicted judicial intrusion
into many aspects of personal decision. . . Presumably this right is broad
enough to encompass a patient’s decisions to decline medical treatment
under certain circumstances, in much the same way it is broad enough to
encompass a woman’s decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions.118
In making this statement, the New Jersey Supreme Court specifically tied their decision
concerning withdrawal of the respirator to that long line of United States Supreme Court
decisions concerning privacy, and particularly to the decision of Roe v. Wade.119 Even
though the Court had allowed the New Jersey State Attorney General to enter the case,
based on a professed “interest of the State in the preservation of life,” the New Jersey
Supreme Court was very specific:
Ultimately there comes a point at which the individual’s rights overcome the State Interest. It is for that reason that we believe Karen’s

respiration, hydration or nutrition.
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Quinlan, p. 23. The New Jersey Supreme Court, at this point, cited Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 US. 438 (1972), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
which mirrors the very citation used by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade.
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Ibid., p. 23. The New Jersey Supreme Court also found such protection
based on privacy in the New Jersey State Constitution, (1947), Art. I, par. 1.
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choice, if she were competent to make it, would be vindicated by
the law.120
The Court went on to then extend this right to Karen’s guardian. In speaking of the
feared criminal prosecution of the doctor who would help her die, the Court stated:
Furthermore, the exercise of a constitutional right such as we have
found is protected from criminal prosecution [citing Stanley v.Georgia,
394 U.S. at 559]. We do not question the State’s undoubted power to
punish the taking of human life, but that power does not encompass
individuals terminating medical treatment pursuant to their right of
privacy. . .the constitutional protection extends to third parties whose
action is necessary to effectuate the exercise of that right where the
individuals themselves would not be subject to prosecution or the third
parties are charged as accessories to an act which could not be a crime. . .121
There is great significance in this language of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
First, the decision clearly shows dependance on Roe v. Wade and its confirmation of a
constitutional right of privacy. Secondly, the Court extends this position from the issue
of abortion in Roe v. Wade to that of withdrawal of a respirator. The Court does this with
language that undoubtedly ties the constitutional right of privacy to the exercise of an
individual’s rights to make medical decisions. Third, a person making a medical decision
to terminate medical treatment pursuant to their right of privacy does so in a process
wherein their individual right outweighs any interest that the state may have in preserving
life. Finally, the exercise of this right not only insulates the doctor from criminal
prosecution, and here the Court does not mince words, it does so because the doctor’s
120

Quinlan, p. 24.
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Ibid., p. 34. The emphasis has been added. This is a dramatic statement defending
O’Neill’s theory of relational autonomy: the physician is protected from retaliation by the
state because the court saw them as being a necessary entity (an obligation bearer) to the
patient’s (rights holder’s) autonomy.
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actions are necessary to effectuate the right. In other words, without the physician’s
actions, there is no right.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not stop there. It also stated:
And, under the circumstances of this case, these same principles would
apply to and negate a valid prosecution for attempted suicide were there
still such a crime in this state. . . 122
What is the Court saying? There is a constitutional right to privacy extended under the
Roe v. Wade case to medical decisions. That right of privacy therefore protects a
person’s decision to withdraw from a respirator, either directly or through a surrogate
decision-maker. Additionally, this protection of the individual’s right is greater than the
state’s interest to protect life, and this would be true even in the case of suicide. Any
action by a physician or a third party necessary to effectuate these rights is protected from
state action, including criminal charges.123
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Quinlan, p. 34.
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This protection from criminal prosecution was evidently important to the New Jersey
Supreme Court in In Re Quinlan because the local attorney general had threatened the
physician in charge of Karen Quinlan with prosecution if he followed the wishes of
Karen’s father and disconnected the respirator. See p. 2 of the opinion which cites that
this local prosecutor was joined in the litigation in order to achieve an injunction
against such action.
It is also important to note that Karen was of the Catholic faith, and the Court
noted that Pope Pius XII had approved the removal of such “extraordinary means of
treatment” and declared that such action was not euthanasia. (p. 14 of the opinion). Pope
John Paul II tried to reverse this interpretation of the Catholic faith. For instance, Nicole
Winfield reported in an Associated Press article (www. Knox News.com, March 21, 2004,
“Vatican City”) which states:
Pope John Paul II said Saturday the removal of feeding tubes from
people in vegetative states is immoral and that no judgment of their
quality of life can justify such “euthanasia by omission. . . Providing
food and water to such patients [PVS] should be considered natural,
ordinary and proportional care. . . As such, it is morally obligatory
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This is not the Supreme Court of the United States cramming down some federal
decision limiting the power of the individual states. This is a state supreme court
interpreting the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the
constitutional right of privacy and agreeing that such a constitutional right limits state
action, even the state’s interest in preserving life. Privacy had become autonomy in
medical decision-making. Other court rulings appeared to justify this interpretation of
what would be a national policy for the right of a patient to make medical decisions based
on this constitutional right of privacy. The New Jersey Supreme Court fortified the
implication of this ideology in 1985 when the case of Conroy came before this judicial
body.124 In this decision, the Court extended its ethical philosophy to the decision to
withdraw a nasogastric feeding tube.125
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court re-visited the issue of privacy when
Cruzan v. Director, MDH came before the Court.126 The Court held that the United

. . .euthanasia always is a violation of God’s law.”
124

Conroy.
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Even though this is true, the Court found on the facts of the case in Conroy that
there was not enough evidence to know the wishes of the medical patient who was in a
minimal conscious condition. The fact that the New Jersey Court reviewed this case is
important: even though they had ruled by Quinlan that the respirator could be
removed, Karen Quinlan did not die when it was removed. She lived on based on
feeding by the nasogastric feeding tube. That fact may have caused the New Jersey
Court to clarify that issue by taking up this case.
126

Cruzan. Both Conroy and this decision may be found at FindLaw.Com under NJSC
and USSC respectively.
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States Constitution does not forbid a state to require evidence of an incompetent’s wishes
as to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment by requiring a evidentiary rule of “clear
and convincing evidence.” Still, the basic rights of privacy remained intact under the Roe
v. Wade and previous decisions.127 However, beginning with the Cruzan decision, a shift
developed in the interpretation of the constitutional right of privacy by the United States
Supreme Court. Before the decade of the 1990s was finished, any hope of a uniform and
national policy of privacy and autonomy in medical decisions had faded into non-existence.

127

The decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in Roe v. Wade has never been
overturned expressly by the Court. However, the Cruzan decision and the case of
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern v. Casey, 91 U.S. 744 (1992), and its companion
Casey v Planned Parenthood, 91 U.S. 902 (1992), show a specific trend towards returning
regulatory power back to the individual states. These cases are hereafter referred to as
Casey. The impact of this retreat from the position of the Roe v. Wade decision, and its
interpretation as seen in Quinlan by state courts, will be covered in the next chapter.
The trend culminates with the decisions of the Washington/Vacco decision in 1998,
which is covered in Chapter Six.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
LEADING UP TO THE WASHINGTON/VACCO DECISIONS: A
NATIONAL POLICY IN CONFLICT
Roe had infuriated a lightly sleeping giant,
And that giant rose up in wrath in the 1970's.128
Justice Rehnquist had written one of the two dissents to the opinion of Roe v.
Wade in 1973. By 1990, when the case of Cruzan reached the Supreme Court of the
United States, Justice Rehnquist had become Chief Justice. The philosophy of his dissent
in Roe v. Wade, and of state rights allowing regulation of state procedure over even
federal constitutional rights, becomes evident in the Cruzan decision. This decision
turned on what burden of evidence a state could require to examine the wishes of an
incompetent concerning the withdrawal of medical life support. The Court held that it
was not a violation of the United States Constitution for a state to regulate those wishes
of an incompetent or unconscious patient by the rule of “clear and convincing evidence.”
Some would argue that the Cruzan decision was the beginning of a disturbing trend
running through contemporary Supreme Court decisions, backing away from the
allowance of a federal constitutional right to declare the supremacy of law throughout the
country. This was the heart of the Roe v. Wade opinion.
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Hull & Hoffer, p.187.
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Even though Roe v. Wade concerned the medical choices of a woman patient
deciding whether or not to have an abortion, and thus terminate the alleged life of the
fetus, the Supreme Court of the United States had never reviewed a case concerning
physician-assisted suicide. This appeared to be the other end of the autonomy question:
could a patient decide to take his own life as a medical choice?

Also, did physicians have

the right or duty to assist them in procuring the technology to do so? It would appear
that this issue would have been decided by those cases such as Quinlan, which concerned
the removal of life support, such as a ventilator, or the nasogastric feeding tube, which
was decided by Conroy. However, in the arena of medical ethics, a difference between
“letting die” and “procuring death” had developed. By 1990, when In Re Cruzan reached
the court, the medical profession and its main professional organization, the American
Medical Association, had clearly defined the ethical correctness of removing life support
technology, or deciding not to supply it. On the other hand, assisting in the death of a
patient was strictly condemned.129

The dispute has arisen, even among the experts of

medical ethics, as to the issue that has come to be put in terms of a difference between
“active” and “passive” euthanasia.
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The condemnation, and its tie to the issue of abortion, is present as early as The
Hippocratic Oath, which was written thousands of years ago in ancient Greece.
See Owsei Temkin and C. Lillian Temkin: Ancient Medicine: Selected Papers of Ludwig
Edelstein (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,1967), p. 6, for a draft
of this oath. The main premise contained in the Oath is “I will neither give a deadly drug
to anybody if asked for it, not will I make a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not
give to a woman an abortive remedy.” For modern rules against physician-assisted
suicide, see the AMA Policies H-140.952; H-270.965; E-2.211 ( which also declares that
physicians should support patient autonomy) and H-140.966. These and the Principles
of Medical Ethics, established by AMA in June, 2001, can be located at the AMA’s
website, www.ama-assn.org.
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Long ago, James Rachels made the argument that there is not a defensible moral
difference between active and passive euthanasia.

Rachels stated:

The distinction between active and passive euthanasia is thought to be
crucial for medical ethics. The idea is that is permissible, at least in
some cases, to withhold treatment and allow a patient to die, but it is
never permissible to take any direct action designed to kill the patient.
This doctrine seems to be accepted by most doctors, and it is endorsed
in a statement adopted in the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association.130
However, Rachels pointed out that by withholding treatment the patient may linger and
take longer to die. This may cause the patient to have even more suffering, after the
decision has been made to let him die. Thus, Rachels argues, being “allowed to die” can
be “relatively slow and painful, whereas being given a lethal injection is relatively quick
and painless.” Rachel’s article claims that some infants born with Down’s Syndrome and
other birth defects who need surgery in order to live are allowed to die by “withholding
treatment.” While the surgical need is sometimes very simple, such as a bowel
obstruction, these babies are allowed to die. In the case of a patient who is terminal, as
determined by medical prediction the physician cannot take action where there is no
defect. Rachels called this “deciding life or death on irrelevant grounds.” This assertion
contains a rare admission or interpretation of the present ethical stance of the medical
profession.
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James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” The New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 292, No. 2 (January 9, 1975, pp. 78-80. Hereinafter referred to as
Rachels. The precise wording that Rachels objected to has since been removed
from the AMA Current Opinions, but the element of his complaint was added back by the
sections on euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.
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In a classic example showing the moral indifference of the distinction between
active and passive euthanasia, Rachels suggests a hypothetical thought experiment
involving two scenarios. In both, a person stands to inherit from their six year old cousin.
In the first scenario, the person sneaks in and drowns the child in a bathtub. In the second,
another person sneaks in, intending to do the same, but observes the child slip in the tub
and strike his head, then watches the child drown while doing nothing to save the child.
One took action, the other “merely watched the child die.” Rachels asked: “did either
behave better, from a moral point of view?” In 1972, the year before Roe v. Wade was
decided, Rachel wrote:
[I]n statements such as the AMA policy statement that I have quoted,
they [physicians] are endorsing this doctrine as a central point of medical
ethics. In that statement, active euthanasia is condemned not merely as
illegal but as “contrary to that for which the medical profession stands,”
whereas passive euthanasia is approved. However, the preceding considerations suggest that there is really no moral difference between the two. . .131
In this article, Rachels eloquently points out that the AMA and the medical
profession at large “should not give the distinction any added authority and weight by
writing it into official statements of medical ethics.”132 Passive euthanasia is ethically
allowed by the AMA in the form of withholding or withdrawing technical life support.
However, “active” treatment, such as writing a prescription that may be used by a patient
to end his or her life, cannot be ethically justified according to the same AMA policies. As
Rachels points out, and many would argue, how can there be any moral difference

131

Rachels. The article appears on pp. 78-80.
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Ibid.
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between two such courses of treatment?
As the Cruzan case reached the Supreme Court of the United States, pressure from
many sources, including the Hemlock Society, begun to build toward a resolution over the
rights of patient autonomy in the area of medical suicide and physician-assisted death.133
As with Roe v. Wade, the champions of a national medical policy concerning this difficult
division over allowed and non-allowed euthanasia were hoping for decisions that would
solve this ethical dilemma. However, the Court’s decision in Cruzan was not aimed at
establishing a national policy. Rather, Rehnquist’s purpose in writing the opinion was to
defer to state’s rights and state law, of which there are fifty different sets. At a critical
juncture of the opinion, Rehnquist wrote:
Most courts have based a right to refuse treatment on the common law
right to informed consent. . .or on both that right and a Constitutional
privacy right [meaning Roe v. Wade]134. . . .State courts have available
to them for decision a number of sources-state constitutions, statutes,
and common law-which are not available to us. . where the question is
simply whether the Federal Constitution prohibits Missouri from choosing the rule of law which it did.135
Keep in mind that the issue before the Court was whether or not the state could
prescribe “rules of evidence” to determine an incompetent or comatose patient’s right to
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The Hemlock Society, which was referred to in Dr. Timothy Quill’s famous story of
“Diane,” is now officially called “End of Life Choices.” Its website, www.hemlock.org,
lists 68,400 links for persons interested in death and dying issues. Ms. Faye Girsh,
Senior Vice President of the society, visited the campus of the University of Tennessee
while I was working on this thesis. Her insights were very helpful to some of the
argument of this thesis.
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Cruzan, p. 6 of the opinion using the FindLaw.com source of the case.
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Ibid., p. 8 using the FindLaw.com source of the case.
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withdraw treatment, and whether such action violated the United States Constitution.
The Roe v. Wade United States Supreme Court decision had declared a national
constitutional right of privacy in making those decisions. What Rehnquist is really saying
in this paragraph is that the United States Supreme Court is going to defer to state law to
make up the rules of procedure and regulations on how the alleged national constitutional
right of privacy is to be upheld. Rehnquist is arguing that because the state constitutions
and state statutes are not available to the United States Supreme Court, which is a federal
court, the decision on implementation of the right of privacy, such as what rule of
evidence to use, has to be decided by state law. While Roe v. Wade did implement a
rising state interest as the woman’s pregnancy proceeded, the woman’s right to privacy in
her medical decision in the first trimester remained absolute.136

However, after In Re

Cruzan, the absolute right of privacy, at least in some medical decisions, blurred into the
inconsistency of fifty different state rules on procedural questions.
Cruzan also begins the replacement of the term “privacy” to stand for this medical
right with more use of the term “liberty” in connection with the Due Process Clause.
Rehnquist’s argument turned on an analogy with issues involving refusal of unwanted
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This “rising state interest” is the very concern of the courts making these decisions. As
the pregnancy goes along, the fetus becomes more nearly viable, even more so as
medical technology gets better and better. If the individual states have an interest “in
preserving life”which they have historically claimed, then such an interest gets stronger as
the fetus gets closer to being able to survive outside the womb. Of course, this is the very
complication that arises in using the same standard of privacy right for those issues of
physician-assisted suicide However, one should ask, since Roe v. Wade was a federal
decision and expressed a United States Constitution fundamental right, historically, what
has been the national government’s interest in preserving life? For instance, there has
never been a Federal crime of murder in this country until very recently.
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treatment, citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a relatively unknown case. Why did
Rehnquist speak of a “liberty interest from battery,” which relied on the interpretation of
individual state opinions, when he had at his disposal the grand, national, constitutional
right of privacy held by Roe v. Wade?
If one compares Cruzan, a decision of the United States Supreme Court deferring
to state law on issues of the autonomy question, to that of Quinlan, a state supreme court
decision deferring the autonomy question to the precedence of the federal constitutional
law of Roe v. Wade, the obvious conclusion must be reached. For whatever reason, it is
obvious that Rehnquist did not cite Roe v. Wade as his compelling authority, even though
he alludes to this decision in the above quote wherein he talks of “privacy.” What was so
clearly obvious to the New Jersey Supreme Court in both Quinlan and Conroy appears to
be opaque to the United States Supreme Court in this decision concerning the right to
privacy and how it affects all medical decisions.
What possible explanation may be given for the United States Supreme Court’s
determination not to use Roe v. Wade’s constitutional power in this opinion?. The matter
at hand worsens when we actually reach the Washington/Vacco decisions. Here is a pair
of cases that turn on the medical patient’s autonomy in suicide, particularly when the
patient needs the physician’s assistance to procure death.137 Yet, in this very lengthy
137

Many times it is overlooked that a terminal ill patient, while yet conscious, or by prior
directive, who has chosen death, they are either too weak, or disabled to accomplish such
an end. Thus the very need for “physician assistance.” As the New Jersey Supreme
Court stated in Quinlan, the surrogate and the physician are protected by helping
the patient as right holder make their medical choice under this constitutional right to
privacy. I believe that the New Jersey Court would even extend this protection to the
physician who assisted in a patient’s suicide. See the quotes indicated in the text of this
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Washington/Vacco opinion, which is also penned by the hand of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Roe v. Wade is not even mentioned.
This trend begins with Cruzan. By its very nature, the Roe v. Wade opinion was
clearly relevant to the Court’s opinion in that it was a United States Supreme Court
decision which was still valid law. Roe v. Wade granted a constitutional right of privacy
in medical choices for such patients as Nancy Cruzan. However, Rehnquist’s opinion
made a tortured dependency on state law the issue of the case, relying on the old defense
of criminal battery to withhold treatment rather than the federal constitutional right of
privacy. Rehnquist admits this in the body of the opinion, stating that “these cases were
few” until Quinlan and blames “the advance of medical technology capable of sustaining
life well past the point where natural forces would have brought certain death in earlier
times.”138 Rehnquist even mentions that the New Jersey Court in Quinlan found a right of
privacy grounded in the federal constitution to terminate treatment, which had been based
on Roe v. Wade, but then states:
After Quinlan, however, most courts have based a right to refuse treatment either solely on the common law right to informed consent or on
both the common law right and a constitutional privacy right.139
Most courts? When has the Supreme Court of the United States been concerned

thesis on pp. 52-54. The Oregon DWDA specifically protects the physician from such
retaliation, criminal or professional, such as sanctions from the AMA or other
professional body.
138

Cruzan, pp. 5-8. One wonders what Rehnquist’s opinion may be today, as he
personally faces life-threatening cancer.
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Ibid., p. 8.
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with what “most courts” are doing? The Supreme Court of the United States is only
interested in what it has done, and that would be deciding Roe v. Wade. However,
Rehnquist then goes on to list state cases that were based more on the informed consent
or battery theory than on the privacy issue. This is totally unnecessary to a court that has
Roe v. Wade in its arsenal as a federal constitutional right. This is an intentional
disregarding of Roe v. Wade in favor of state cases to make a determination in a United
States Constitutional case.
This makes no historical or legal sense. However, it makes perfect political sense.
Rehnquist is intentionally trying to distinguish the cases of physician-assisted death, or the
ethical issue relating to the contrast between “active” and “passive” euthanasia, from the
issue of autonomy contrasted to the Roe v. Wade decision. And Rehnquist’s reasons for
doing so are not so easy to see. On page ten of the opinion, Rehnquist makes the
following statement, given the issue of procedural rule in Cruzan, it is out of context and
makes no sense:
Moreover, the majority of States in this country have laws imposing
criminal penalties on one who assists another to commit suicide.140
What does suicide have to do with the issues in Cruzan? Quinlan, a state supreme
court decision, followed the right of privacy based on the Roe v. Wade decision, and even
extended it to a surrogate guardian. The New Jersey Supreme Court then added language
to protect the medical professional and even commented on the extension of the right of
privacy to grant autonomy to those medical patients considering suicide. However,
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Cruzan, p. 8.
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Rehnquist ignores Roe v. Wade in the Cruzan opinion and strives to find a basis in
multiple state laws to support the surrogate’s right to disconnect life-sustaining
technology based on informed consent and battery which protects the right not to be
“touched.”. Obviously, there is an issue at play here other than just interpretation of the
law based on prior United States Supreme Court decisions. There is even an obvious
disregard for the judicial principle of stare decisis which the United States Supreme Court
usually rigorously follows.141
Here we have a minor142 dissenting jurist in Roe v. Wade, one who dissented in
favor of state’s rights, effectively overruling the Supreme Court decision in later years as a
Chief Justice on a political mission.143

That mission became particularly clear in the
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Stare decisis stands for the principle of constitutional interpretation wherein the court
uses past decisions to build upon and enforce decisions that follow. Unless the court
specifically and explicitly overturns the prior decision, the court cannot issue an opinion
that disregards such prior rulings.
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Minor is a choice of words. Rehnquist was not even on the Supreme Court of the
United States in 1971 when it first heard Roe v. Wade. He was appointed by President
Richard Nixon between the first and second hearings of the case. His opinions about
abortion were untested, and Roe v. Wade was one of the very first opinions by the Court
that contained him as a member. For a fascinating description of this fact see
Weddington, p. 131. Hull & Hoffer put it this way: “Justice Rehnquist, the most junior
of the justices. .”( p. 178)
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According to Weddington, Rehnquist was wrong from the first, particularly his dissent
in Roe v. Wade:
Rehnquist mentioned recent years when states had anti-abortion statutes
but what about the many years before, when the national and state constitutions were written, during which abortion was legal? Even when the
anti-abortion laws were passed, the fetus was still not treated as a legal
person. When I read his phrase “right to an abortion” I wanted to say,
“No, no, it’s a right to make one’s own choices.”
Weddington, p. 167. The emphasis is added.
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Washington/Vacco decision. However, before those cases reached the Supreme Court of
the United State’s attention, Casey came before the Court.144
Casey is the last major word from the United States Supreme Court on the
abortion issue as of this date. It is important to note that even in this decision Roe v.
Wade is not explicitly overturned. The case did evaluate and further allow individual state
regulation of abortion, and attempted to clarify issues that had evolved from prior United
States Supreme Court decisions concerning abortion that had been heard since Roe v.
Wade. However, the importance of the decision to our purposes here is the boldness of
Rehnquist’s views, which are dramatically declared in his dissent to this opinion.
There can be little doubt about Rehnquist’s position, beginning with his dissent in
Roe v. Wade. It is even legally questionable whether or not the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, considering the legal doctrine of stare decisis, should
be quite so open in attacking the position of the United States Supreme Court in the Roe
v. Wade opinion. This is still unquestionably a valid decision of the Court.145 However, in
the Casey dissent, Rehnquist says the following:
We believe that Roe was wrongly decided, and that it can and should
be overruled consistently with our traditional approach to stare
decisis in constitutional cases. We would adopt the approach of the
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Casey. I am using the text from the Legal Information Institute found on the web at
supct.law.cornell.edu/supct.
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Meaning only that the opinion has not been explicitly overturned by any Supreme Court
ruling since Roe v. Wade was decided in 1973. It is one of the premises of this thesis,
however, that Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinions and the opinions of the Supreme Court
in other cases have technically destroyed the value of the Roe v. Wade decision.
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plurality in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989),
and uphold the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statue in their
entirety.146
This is a bold declaration, and some time needs to be spent so that one can understand
Rehnquist’s opinion on this matter. Just what is driving this jurist to distance himself from
the Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade?
If one follows Rehnquist’s development of this dissent, Rehnquist’s quest to
overturn the Roe v. Wade opinion becomes quite clear as a process over multiple years
and multiple cases. It is important to remember that his dissent in that opinion was a
historical review and denunciation of the Supreme Court’s opinion in that case,
emphasizing that some states had already declared abortion illegal at the time of the
passing of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Supposedly, to
Rehnquist, these states would not have passed the 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution if they had realized that this would cause abortion to be legal.147
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Casey, p. l of the dissent.
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This is really based on a false understanding of history. The Constitution of the United
States is called a “living document” because by interpretation it can keep up with the
changes that history forces upon us. Times change. When the 14th Amendment was
under consideration, abortion usually resulted in damage or death to the woman
involved. This caused a state interest “in preserving life” that was no longer true in 1973
when Roe v.Wade was considered by the Court. It is not important what state laws were
in effect at some other time in history, which is Rehnquist’s error. It is only vital what
state interests at this time allow intervention with our rights given by the Constitution of
the United States.
For confirmation of this lesson of history, see Sykes discussion of it in End of
Privacy, p. 92. Sykes refers to the Harvard Law Review article written in 1898 by
Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, in which they argued that “political, social, and
economic changes entail the recognition of new rights,” and that “the common law. . .
grows to meet the demands of society.” Sykes argues that this article was largely
responsible for the foundation of the modern tort system in this country. This is the same
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Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey provides an excellent depiction of the confusion
Rehnquist’s opinions have caused concerning the issue of abortion in the United States
and his intent to return the entire matter back to separate state regulation. Of course, the
problem with separate state regulation is that it sets up the risk of fifty different concepts
of legality and denies the United State uniformity on a position of national importance, not
only to the women’s movement for equal rights, but to universality in consideration of a
very important ethical right, the right of autonomy.148
Rehnquist admits that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court have left
confusion for the lower courts.149 He even offers the following:
But, as the Court of Appeals found, the state of our post-Roe decisional
law with the regulation of abortion is confusing and uncertain, indicating
that a reexamination of that line of cases is in order.150
But reexamination is not really what Rehnquist is after. This becomes clear, later, when
he states:

article used as a source by Beauchamp & Childress.
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especially in the field of ethics.
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The task of the Court of Appeals in the present case was obviously
complicated by this confusion and uncertainty. . .this state of confusion and disagreement warrants reexamination of the “fundamental
right” accorded to a woman’s decision to abort a fetus in Roe, with
its concomitant requirement that any state regulation of abortion survive “strict scrutiny.”151
Is Rehnquist saying that the confusion caused by the Supreme Court itself in other
opinions, after the Roe v. Wade decision, creates a reason to examine whether or not the
holding of Roe v. Wade was correct as to its finding that the fundamental right in question
exists? Just how does that logically follow? Rehnquist’s reasoning apparently begins as
follows:
We have held that a liberty interest protected under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will be deemed fundamental if
it is “Implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S.97 (1934).152
This is essential, and Palko v. Connecticut is in fact one of the very cases the United
Supreme Court cited in the Roe v. Wade decision. Rehnquist continues:
In construing the phrase “liberty” incorporated in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have recognized that its
meaning extends beyond freedom from physical restraint.153. . .
But a reading of these opinions makes clear that they do not endorse any all encompassing “right of privacy.”154
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As Rehnquist concludes, Roe v. Wade went too far:
In Roe v. Wade, the Court recognized a “guarantee of personal privacy”
which “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. . .We are now of the view that, in terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe read the earlier opinions
upon which it based its decision much too broadly. Unlike marriage,
procreation and contraception, abortion “involves the purposeful termination of potential life”. . .The abortion decision must therefore be
recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the others that the
Court has protected under the rubric of personal or family privacy
and autonomy..155
Rhenquist is arguing that the previous cases, cited both here by him and by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, support the privacy and autonomy of a person or family in
decisions of marriage, procreation, and contraception, but not abortion, because abortion
“terminates potential life”? Does not contraception prevent potential life?156
But Rehnquist is not finished. Now we are going to base an interpretation of the
United States Constitution on “historical traditions”:
Nor do the historical traditions of the American people support the view
that the right to terminate one’s pregnancy is “fundamental.”. . . On this
record, it can scarcely be said that any deeply rooted tradition of relatively
unrestricted abortion in our history supported the classification of the right
to abortion as “fundamental” under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.157
Just what American people is Rehnquist talking about? First he talks about the Common
Law of England. Then he talks about the “turn of the century” in America. Then he
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admits that by the time of Roe v. Wade only twenty-one states still had laws totally
outlawing abortion..
What Rehnquist ignores in all of this discourse is what the whole Supreme Court
recognized in the Roe v. Wade decision. It is not the right to abortion that is then
recognized as fundamental, but rather the right to privacy which in this particular case is
being applied to medical choices, one of which is the choice of abortion. Since the
Constitution of the United States reserves all other rights to the people, beyond that which
it denies, our system of government depends on a balancing of individual rights against the
need for areas where our law is entitled to allow interference by the state in people’s lives.
As the historical tradition does show, the state’s interest prior to 1973 was the
preservation of life because, medically speaking, women had traditionally died and
suffered from the process of abortion. As the Court recognized in the Roe v. Wade
decision, not only had medical technology made the process of abortion much safer, as
previously noted, the death rates declining to that of around the death rate from delivering
babies, but there was a growing sense of personal autonomy in medical decisions driving
choice away from the paternal instinct of the medical profession and placing it squarely in
the thoughts of the individual patient. Rehnquist completely ignores this. Why? Because,
as he so clearly stated, he has a problem with the alleged fact that abortion terminates
life.158 Traditionally, as previously noted, the law has never supported any legal rights of
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the unborn fetus.159
Rehnquist is basically challenging the constitutional interpretation of the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, in its finding of a fundamental right to privacy extended to the
issue of abortion. He bases this challenge not on almost one hundred years of case law by
his predecessors, but on a personal belief as to when life begins..
Regardless of this, Rehnquist concludes his dissent as follows:
For the reasons stated, we therefore would hold that each of the challenged
provisions of the Pennsylvania statute is consistent with the Constitution..
It bears emphasis that our conclusions in this regard does not carry with it
any necessary approval of these regulations. Our task is, as always, to decide
only whether the challenged provisions of a law comport with the United
States Constitution. If, as we believe, these do, their wisdom as a matter of public
policy is for the people of Pennsylvania to decide.160
This is a questionable statement. One can easily see Rehnquist’s preference for state
159
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United States was a listing of state court opinions and federal laws that had “decided that
a fetus did not have the legal rights of a person.” Her process started with the United
States Constitution itself:
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
refers to “all persons born or naturalized.” A fetus is neither. The actual
murder law in Texas, the state from which Roe v. Wade arose, “applied
only to the killing of one who had been born.” “Property rights were contingent upon being born alive. There had never been a tort [personal injury
recovery in Texas as the result of an injury to fetus not born alive ( p. 97).
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rights, but that was obvious from his dissent in Roe v.Wade. But why should the people
of one state have the ability to change a right that is protected by the federal constitution?
Only a careful examination of Rehnquist’s words reveal that his determination is
not based on a review of the Constitution of the United States. If it were, those words of
the United States Constitution, “separation of church and state” should have come to
mind, in that a personal belief as to when life begins is usually a religious belief.

The

Supreme Court of the United States cannot base interpretation of the Constitution on
personal beliefs, whether religious or otherwise. The legal interpretation of “when life
begins” is historically very clear.
State rights are important. But they are not as important as the rights reserved to
the people by the United States Constitution. Nothing is clearer than the fact that the
position of medical technology concerning abortion had pretty much eradicated any state
interest in that medical procedure by 1973. The Constitutional rights of the women
involved, their right to privacy as a fundamental right, had grown to the point that it
surpassed the state’s interest in this matter. And yet Rehnquist, and to some degree the
entire United States Supreme Court, seems bent on a course of letting the individual states
decide these issue by rules and regulations that deflect and damage the underlying rights of
the individuals involved.
Perhaps Charles J. Sykes has said it best in his book The End of Privacy.161 He
aptly entitled the chapter of this book on the courts and privacy as “Losing Ground.”.
Here he states:
161
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Unfortunately, despite its lengthy philosophical and political pedigree,
privacy has a decidedly mixed record in the courts, both as a constitutional question and as a cause of private legal action. In both cases, it
is not going too far to say that the state of the law is a mess, a patchwork
of false starts, inconsistent applications, and muddled and contradictory
rulings. In constitutional law, the courts have lagged far behind the
developments in technology in applying the Fourth Amendment. . . 162
This is a very problematic situation, if one would wish to use constitutional interpretation
as a measure or foundation for deciding issues of medical ethics. It is akin to finding out
that Moses wrote the seventh commandment because someone was out to kill him.
And yet, prior to the case of Washington/Vacco, the Court’s determination to
restrict and regulate the privacy rights of individuals had not extinguished the right
completely. Unfortunately, that was about to happen.
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CHAPTER SIX:
THE WASHINGTON/VACCO DECISIONS:
Politics, not law, held abortion rights in its grasp.163

When the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill reached the
Supreme Court of the United States, the issue of physician-assisted suicide was directly
before the Court for the first time. In Washington v. Glucksberg the question presented
was whether the State of Washington’s prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide
“offended the 14th Amendment.” Any student of the Roe v. Wade opinion, especially as
interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in In Re Quinlan, would think that such a
statute would offend the protection offered by the right of privacy found in the
interpretation of the United States Constitution by prior decisions and Roe v. Wade,
particularly with the language of the In Re Quinlan decision making the legal connection
to a discussion of a person’s rights concerning suicide.
However, the United States Supreme Court, in this decision, held that the
Washington statute offered no such offense. This was particularly harmful to the progress
which was made toward recognizing a constitutional right to privacy in medical decisions
by the Roe v. Wade and In Re Quinlan decisions.

This was especially striking in that the

plaintiffs in the Washington case had specifically asserted that there was a “liberty interest”
163
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protected by the 14th Amendment concerning the issue of physician-assisted suicide.. The
underlying Federal District Court had agreed, in relying both on the Cruzan and on the
Casey decision. At first, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, but after an additional
hearing en banc164, the full court stated the following while discussing Roe v. Wade:
The Court [in Roe v. Wade] first determined a woman had a constitutional right to choose an abortion. Only after it did so, did it proceed to
the second . . .whether the state’s prohibition on assistance unconstitutionally restricted the exercise of that liberty. . .165
This is partially what this thesis has argued throughout: Roe v. Wade is a case extending
the constitutional right of privacy to that of the abortion rights of women, and here is the
Federal 9th Circuit Court of Appeals stating that fact. The 9th Circuit Court cited Roe v.
Wade at least seven times, In Re Cruzan at least eight times and, of great importance, the
Casey decision at least eight times.
The importance of using the Casey decision, which had been decided in 1992, lay
in an attempt by the 9th Circuit Court to implement Rehnquist’s appeal to “a liberty
interest” in that earlier case. This was an attempt to replace the words “a right to privacy”
which was used in the in the Roe v. Wade and Quinlan decisions. The 9th Circuit even
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mentions Rehnquist’s famous dissent in the Roe v. Wade decision.166
The fact of the 9th Circuit appealing to “a liberty interest” can be seen throughout
the opinion, but no better place than their conclusion and decision in this case:
A common thread running through these cases is that they involve
decisions that are highly personal and as well as of great importance
to the individual. . .Certainly, few decisions are more personal, intimate or important than the decision to end one’s life, especially when
the reason for doing so is to avoid excessive and protracted pain.
Accordingly, we believe the cases from Pierce to Roe provide strong
general support for our conclusion that a liberty interest in controlling
the time and manner of one’s death is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.167
This was an attempt by the 9th Circuit to cure the ills that bothered Rehnquist in his dissent
in Roe v. Wade, and in his opinions as Chief Justice in the Cruzan and Casey decisions.
The Casey decision was important to the 9th Circuit in that it was a major case revisiting
the abortion issue of Roe v. Wade, and even though it allowed more state regulation, the
decision did not specifically overturn that prior case. This is seen in the very last words
of the 9th Circuit’s opinion:
While the cases we have adverted to lend general support to our conclusion, we believe that two relative prior decisions of the Court,
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992) and Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990), are fully persuasive,
and leave little doubt as to the proper result.168
This appears to be a solid decision by the 9th Circuit. The decision follows the
history of the prior “privacy” cases examined by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade but,
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more importantly, blends the arguments of the Cruzan and Casey decisions to
accommodate Rehnquist’s appeal to “liberty.” In other words, the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals is stating that the constitutional right to privacy found in Roe v. Wade is just the
same type of right as the right to liberty found by Rehnquist in the later opinions of
Cruzan and Casey. When the combined cases of Washington/Vacco reached the
Supreme Court, in yet another opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court of the United States reversed this 9th Circuit Court opinion. Once again, the Chief
Justice cited numerous state laws and the American common law traditions that have
punished suicide and assisted suicide, ignoring the federal law in previous constitutional
decisions. Rehnquist even boldly points to the Cruzan decision and its reliance on state
law and battery concepts rather than on the long line of constitutional decisions that
formed the background to the Roe v. Wade decision. Rehnquist cites Cruzan and states
that it “was not simply deduced from abstract concepts of personal autonomy.”169 Of
course, that is correct, but entirely ignores the constitutional law that led to the Roe v.
Wade decision, which is not some “abstract decision” on personal autonomy. The Roe v.
Wade opinion follows almost a century of careful deliberations by many different Supreme
Court justices that upheld the right to privacy as a constitutional right. As has been
carefully explained, the first holding of Roe v. Wade was the finding of a constitutional
right to privacy. Secondly, the Court in that opinion discussed whether or not the
individual states could take away the liberty interest so found in the form of as a right to
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privacy. In Roe v. Wade the issue was abortion and whether that medical decision was
within the right to privacy in question. The Court said that it was within that
constitutional right. This is the judicial importance of that decision, which was expressed
by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Casey.
Roe v. Wade deliberately expands the right of privacy found in previous United
States Supreme Court decisions to include the right to make an abortion decision. It is
obvious what Rehnquist is doing in attempts to fundamentally re-write the Roe v. Wade
decision some thirty years later. In the entire opinion of the Washington/Vacco decisions,
Rehnquist never uses the word “privacy.” It is as if the long line of cases discussing the
right of privacy simply disappears.
Near the end of the Washington v Glucksberg opinion, Rehnquist’s ideology
becomes clearer and more apparent. Once again, he refers to the predominance of state
laws, and then writes as follows:
Through-out the Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue,
as it should in a democratic society.170
This decision by the United States Supreme Court immediately made the Oregon
Death With Dignity Act, which had been passed by that State’s Initiative process in 1994,
legal. However, after the precedent-setting decision in Roe v. Wade, which declared a
constitutional right of privacy throughout the United States for the purpose of making
decisions in medical matters, did Justice Rehnquist really believe that what was best for
170
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the nation was for the debate on such autonomy to continue to potentially fifty different
legal rulings on a question of such ethical importance? It is obvious in reading the
opinion that this is exactly what he intended, and thought was best for the country.
This type of legal ideology ignores two hundred years of constitutional law. It also
ignores the very idea expressed in the United States Constitution that the United States
Supreme Court was to rectify and solve conflicts between the several of the fifty states,
and ignores that such a ruling also left conflicts between the different Districts of the
Federal Court of Appeals. Rehnquist’s decision completely vacated the constitutional line
of argument expressed by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Washington and the
2nd Circuit Court of Appeals in the Vacco v. Quill decision that was heard at the same
time.171 Quill was brought by the petitioner and argued more solidly on the basis of the
Equal Protection Clause, but the decision of the Supreme Court is also represented by a
Rehnquist opinion. The 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals stated it this way:
New York law does not treat equally all competent persons who are in
the final stages of fatal illness and wish to hasten their deaths [because]
those in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life support systems are allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal of such
systems; but those who are similarly situated, except for the previous
attachment of life sustaining equipment, are not allowed to hasten death
by self-administering prescribed drugs.172
The United States Supreme Court decision by Rehnquist goes on to state that the 2nd
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Circuit Court believed that “the ending of life by [withdrawal] is nothing more nor less
than assisted suicide.”173 As in the Washington v Glucksberg opinion, Rehnquist avoids
any use of the word “privacy” in the Quill decision. The case was decided by a ruling that
the New York law did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States
Constitution, and Rehnquist merely points to the Washington v Glucksberg opinion as the
justification for his ruling.
The classic constitutional interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause commands
that “no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws.”174

However, what Rehnquist centers on is the constitutional interpretation that a

fundamental right found to be existing in the United States Constitution can be regulated
by the states, so long as it is not regulated completely out of existence. This is essentially
the ruling found in the Casey decision when the Supreme Court once again took up the
abortion issue. But Rehnquist is slipping from the use of the term “privacy” found as a
fundamental constitutional right in Roe v.Wade to emphasis on the interest of “liberty.”
The Court is not overruling the Roe v. Wade holding, nor any of the cases based on the
privacy right handed down historically before that decision. Yet the ultimate decision of
the Washington/Vacco decisions is that the states can completely eradicate physicianassisted suicide.
If the constitutional right of privacy is a fundamental right, which Roe v. Wade
clearly states that it is, then if there is a “compelling state interest” that right can be
173
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regulated, although not out of existence completely. Quinlan, which found its support in
Roe v. Wade, clearly extended this decision to that of withdrawal of life support
technology, and even to the issue of a person’s medical choice of suicide. In so doing, the
New Jersey Supreme Court specifically said, citing Roe v. Wade, that the fundamental
right of the individual’s privacy in medical decisions was a greater interest than even the
state’s interest in preserving life. Rehnquist totally ignores this ruling, which is basically
ignoring the decision of Roe v. Wade. Of course, the United States Supreme Court is not
limited by an interpretation by a state supreme court, but surely they are limited by their
own prior decision under the Supreme Court’s use of the stare decisis doctrine described
earlier. Regardless, the United States Supreme Court decision in Vacco v.Quill states the
following:
The Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall “Deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” This
provision creates no substantive rights. SanAntonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). . . If a legislative classification
or distinction ‘neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect c
lass,’ we will uphold so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate
end.175
True, the Equal Protection Clause does not create substantive rights. And, unfortunately,
the Vacco v. Quill case was brought before the Supreme Court on an Equal Protection
Clause question. Because of this, the Court here is speaking of the rights associated with
that clause of the United States Constitution and not of the right to privacy upheld by Roe
v. Wade.
However, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v.Wade definitely
175
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did interpret a substantive right. In fact, that decision declared a fundamental
constitutional right to privacy. Without Roe v. Wade, Rehnquist’s legal reasoning, as
quoted above, would be a sound interpretation of constitutional law. However, in making
this declaration, Rehnquist is purposively ignoring the fundamental right interpreted by
Roe v. Wade. Even if the Vacco v. Quill decision was based on consideration of equal
protection under the laws, the Supreme Court of the United States is not helpless. It did
not have to worry about individual state battery law issues, or flail around helpless because
the individual states can regulate non-substantive right issues, even out of existence. So
Rehnquist is right: the Equal Protection Clause does not create any substantive rights.
However, a proper Supreme Court ruling could not ignore another right of the petitioners
so obviously present: the fundamental right of privacy established by Roe v. Wade to
make one’s own medical decisions.
The Vacco v.Quill opinion goes on to rely on New York and other state’s history of
statutes outlawing suicide, and physician assistance in suicide, stating that they “affect and
address matters of profound significance to all New Yorkers alike,” and that such New
York laws “neither infringe fundamental rights nor involve suspect classifications,” also
referring the reader of the opinion to Washington v Glucksberg.176 This is just the same
pattern of using state law and state history to determine constitutional law that Rehnquist
first used in the Cruzan opinion. Rehnquist also wrote:
Unlike the Court of Appeals, we think the distinction between assisting
suicide and withdrawing life sustaining treatment, a distinction widely
recognized and endorsed in the medical profession and in our legal tradi176
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tions, is both important and logical.177
The Supreme Court of the United States’s opinion then concludes that the decision of the
Appellate Court must be reversed in that “These valid and important public interests easily
satisfy the constitutional requirement that a legislative classification bear a rational relation
to some legitimate end.”178
When these two decisions of Washington/Vacco are compared to the Casey
decision, the glaring error in constitutional interpretation becomes apparent. In Casey,
which was a direct review of Roe v. Wade, the Court clearly states that while a state may
legitimately legislate rules and regulations that require a legitimate state interest,
they cannot legislate a substantive fundamental right out of existence. However, in the
decisions of Washington/Vacco, concerning a direct examination of physician-assisted
death, the Supreme Court of the United States finds no such fundamental right, and
essentially concludes that the states can not only regulate, but deny such interests. This is
because Rehnquist, writing in both Washington v.Glucksberg and Vacco v.Quill searches
for state history and statutes for support of the alleged right instead of relying on the
constitutional right of privacy declared in Roe v. Wade and confirmed in the Casey
decision.
As we have seen, through authority as high as the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
Quinlan decision and two federal Courts of Appeals behind the Washington/Vacco
cases, this is illogical and bad constitutional interpretation. The New Jersey Supreme Court
177
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based its classic opinion on the right to remove the respirator from Karen Quinlan on United
States constitutional law and the decision of Roe v. Wade as to her right to privacy, not
state law, or state historical considerations. For the Supreme Court of the United States to
decide the Washington/Vacco cases on such state issues and ignore its own decision in Roe
v.Wade is not only embarrassing, but it’s the argument of this thesis that these decisions will
not bear the test of time of constitutional interpretation any more than the Dred Scott
decision that found slaves in the United States to be less than full human beings.

The importance of the decision before the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Washington/Vacco cases cannot be historically underestimated. No less than twelve
different state legislatures, in opposition to what the literature states is the preference of the
people, had proposed laws like those in the States of Washington and New York attempting
to strike down the right of physician-assisted suicide. When one considers that the State of
Oregon received its law as a result of an initiative of its population at large, not the state
legislature, it appears there is a large popular recognition of such a right.179 By some
sources at this time, more than two-thirds of the people in the United States are said to
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support physician-assisted suicide.180
Concerning philosophy and medical ethics, the Washington/Vacco decisions are also
important because of the Philosopher’s Brief, which was filed as an amicus curiae in favor
of physician-assisted suicide by Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagle, Robert Nozick, John
Rawls, Thomas Scanlon and Judith Jarvis Thomson, some of philosophy’s most
distinguished scholars at the time.181 In the introduction to the brief, Dworkin pointed out
the significance of the fact that both the 2nd and the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals had ruled
that “the Constitution forbids the government from flatly prohibiting doctors to help end
such desperate and pointless suffering.” He also noted that while the AMA was solidly
against the proposed right, the American Medical Students Association filed an amicus brief
in favor of physician-assisted suicide. This would make it appear that young doctors and
medical students are more attuned to the present will of the population at large on this
subject. Finally, Dworkin noted that the “double-effect” doctrine was defied by “common
180
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abortion, they would not be permitted to regulate it out of existence.
For an opposite viewpoint of the decision, see George J. Annas, JD, MPH: “The Bell
Tolls for a Constitutional Right to Physician-Assisted Suicide,” The New England Journal
of Medicine, vol. 337, No. 15, (October 9, 1997), pp. 1098-1103.
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sense.” If the intention of withdrawal of any medical support is death, Dworkin went on,
then, while permitted, it is physician-assisted death as well. He concluded that “The
distinction between acts that aim at death and those that do not cannot justify a
constitutional distinction between assisting in suicide and terminating life support.”182
Perhaps the most important matter in The Philosopher’s Brief is Dworkin’s
observation that the Solicitor General, who bore the responsibility for arguing the Clinton
Administration’s position on this matter, admitted in his brief that “A liberty interest was at
stake in these cases.” The Philosopher’s Brief itself adopted the position of the 9th Circuit
Court’s opinion, which followed the “abortion cases,” with great reliance on Cruzan and
concludes with a quote from Justice O’Connor in that case:
That right encompasses the right to exercise some control over the time
and manner of one’s death. . . A state may not deny the liberty claimed
by the patient-plaintiffs in these cases. . .If, on the other hand, this Court
reverses the decisions below, its decision could only be justified by the
momentous proposition-a proposition flatly in conflict with the spirit and
letter of the Court’s past decisions--that an American citizen does not, after
all, have the right, even in principle, to live and die in the light of his own
religious and ethical beliefs, his own convictions about why his life is
valuable and where its value lies. . .183
In that same case Justice O’Conner had also stated: “. . .each individual has a right to make
the most intimate and personal choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”
Clearly, the Washington/Vacco decisions are incorrect. They are not supported by a
correct interpretation of constitutional law, even if one agrees with Rehnquist’s preference
for consideration of “liberty” over “privacy.” In deciding these cases, the United States
182
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Supreme Court ignored the arguments in the Philosopher’s Brief, the lower Federal
Appellate Courts of Appeal in both the 2nd and 9th Circuits, and the rights of the plaintiff’s in
both cases, in its determination that no right to physician-assisted suicide exists at all. The
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in so doing, never mentions Roe v.
Wade nor discusses the constitutional right to privacy found in that decision .
In deciding the case of Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the
interpretation of the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade that there was a
substantive and fundamental right to privacy in the federal constitution. Though such right
can be regulated, it can never be regulated out of existence. The court reviewed the
historical line of cases upon which the Roe v. Wade opinion depended, and found that the
right to privacy in such instances of withdrawing medical life support technologies will
always outweigh the state’s right to regulate, especially the state’s claim to have an
interest in the preservation of life.. This is the correct constitutional law interpretation.
It is embarrassing, or should be, to anyone legally trained, that the best constitutional
law on the issue of the right to privacy exists in a state supreme court interpreting the
United States Constitution and United States Supreme Court decisions, and the worst
federal constitutional law is represented by the United States Supreme Court itself when it
interprets state law to overcome a United States constitutional right.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:
CONCLUSION:
No legal historian or constitutional scholar can
doubt that Roe is now a centerpiece of our constitutional
history, in particular the constitutionalization of the rights
of women and the right of privacy.184

This thesis must conclude that the enactment of law in the United States of America,
and the interpretation of the United States Constitution by decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, may, at least initially, offer some guidance and foundation for medical
ethics on the issue of autonomy. Such law is the will of the people governed. Additionally,
the process of law and judicial interpretation can progress much more rapidly than
discussion of the standard foundations of ethical philosophy, which has taken thousands of
years to develop. And while it may or may not be a better representation of the ethical
feelings of the population of the United States than the edicts of religious authority, it is of
course required to uphold the distinct separation of the rule of church and religion in ethical
matters from the power of the state which our federal constitution requires. In any case,
this thesis can more specifically conclude that what is meant by “autonomy” in medical
ethics circles and what is meant by “privacy” and “liberty” in legal circles apparently sprang
from the same roots and can be regarded as basically concerned with the same philosophical
concept.
Unfortunately, if the ethical right of autonomy depends on uniform and universal
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rules defining that right, which this thesis is taking for granted, then philosophy cannot in
fact depend on the interpretation of the United States constitutional rights with any hope of
consistent guidance. The ethic of medical autonomy, whether described as a right of privacy
to make medical decisions as in the Roe v. Wade decision, or as described as a liberty
interest to decide and make medical choices about one’s own body and medical fate as the
United States Supreme Court ruled in Cruzan and the Casey decisions, cannot be reconciled
with a United States Supreme Court decision completely destroying such a federal and
national right. The latter, unfortunately, is what has been done in the decision known as
Washington/Vacco.
However, this thesis should not leave this issue without pointing out a significant
view that echoes the connection made here between the Roe v. Wade decision and the issue
of physician-assisted suicide as in question in the Washington/Vacco decisions. This thesis
has exhibited several comments from legal scholars and historians, as well as philosophers,
that connect these issues and these United States Supreme Court decisions. However, the
view of their connection expressed by Michael J. Perry in his book We The People: The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court resonates, albeit discordantly, with many
things that have been said here.185 Perry’s book begins by quoting Justice Harlan’s dissent in
the famous 1896 Supreme Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson. In that opinion, Harlan
stated in part that “There is a dangerous tendency in these latter days to enlarge the function
of the court, by means of judicial interference with the will of the people as expressed by the
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legislature.”186 Perry’s view is that Harlan’s reference is to the “will of the people” by state
legislative action. This may be or may not be what Justice Harlan was referring to in the
quoted comment. In any case, Perry states:
The claim at the heart of today’s controversy is substantially the same
claim that was at the heart of most earlier controversies about situational
rulings by the Court–namely, that in the guise of interpreting the Constitution, the Supreme Court is actually usurping prerogatives that under the
Constitution belong to one or more other branches or agencies of government.187
Perry takes this view of “usurpation” on the part of the Court directly to the issues
of our concern in Chapter 6 of his book, which is entitled “Further Beyond: Abortion and
Physician-Assisted Suicide.” On the first page of this chapter, Perry states:
No constitutional decision by the Supreme Court in the modern period of
American constitutional law has been more controversial–certainly none
has been more persistently controversial–than the Court’s ruling in Roe.
Even after more than a quarter of a century, the legitimacy of the Court’s
decision is widely and furiously contested.188
This is partially true and partially questionable, if one is claiming to be a legal scholar writing
in 1999. The first part is certainly true, but as this thesis has pointed out, after Casey in
1992, few legal scholars still question the legitimacy of Roe v.Wade’s core. But Perry
claims that “Roe v. Wade constitutes one of the greatest–and, therefore, one of the
worst–judicial usurpations of American politics in the period since World War II..189 This is
a problem: “usurping legislative prerogative,” whether state or federal, even if one grants it
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is some kind of “usurpation,” is not necessarily political. Further, Perry’s standard for
whether the Supreme Court acts correctly is twofold:
The Court’s ruling that state legislation outlawing pre-viability abortion
is unconstitutional is fairly characterized as a judicial usurpation of our
politics if the ruling can be grounded neither in any norm established by
“We the people” nor in any norm that has become constitutional bedrock
for us.190
The Fourteenth Amendment, wherein Perry finds all of his authority for all of his
conclusions, is very specific about what state legislatures can do, and this has been discussed
fully here. This Amendment contains the warning that states cannot “abridge the privileges
or immunities” of persons, or “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law,” or deny the “equal protection of the laws.” This Amendment is all about
what the states cannot do, not what legislatures of the states are allowed to do.
In any case, Perry finds that Roe v. Wade cannot be justified by either of his two rules.
Recalling the words quoted above of Justices O’Conner, Souter and Kennedy in the Casey
opinion, Perry can find no “bedrock” to justify Roe v. Wade, or Casey for that matter. But
the real problem with Perry’s analysis begins with the title of his book. For he holds himself
to a review that only regards the 14th Amendment. This is something that a constitutional
scholar can never do. Even though Perry correctly sees the connection between Roe v.
Wade and the Washington/Vacco decisions, and many have not, his analysis of the issues
involved in those cases is fraught with the same mistake that Chief Justice Rehnquist has
now made for over thirty years: the various parts of the Constitution of the United States
cannot be reviewed in isolation from one another , nor can one be held to a wholly literal
190
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reading of the text. The Constitution, quite simply, must be properly interpreted, and done
so as a whole document.191
Perry’s conclusion forgets that the legislative power of the individual states is held as
subject to limitation by the 14th Amendment. The Bill of Rights in their entirety speak to
limiting the power of the federal government and retaining unmentioned rights to the people.
The Constitution, as concerns these Amendments, is addressed to limiting the power of both
the federal and individual states. More importantly, Perry is one who writes both about
abortion and physician-assisted suicide, and yet, who, like Chief Justice Rehnquist, just
cannot quite seem to say or write the word “privacy.” Perry’s analysis ignores the
constitutional development that created the liberty and privacy rights. This process did not
come from the 14th Amendment alone, but from many of the Amendments and other
paragraphs of the Constitution.192 And finally, as suggested above, Perry’s work betrays his
confusion over what makes a question “political.” Politics certainly is involved in the
legislative process of both the national government and the states, but politics is not what
the founders of the United States Constitution had in mind when they wrote this historical
document, which does not even mention political parties or their function.
Today, unfortunately, “politics,” in a distinctly negative sense, has indeed intruded
into matters involving the United States Supreme Court. Laurence H. Tribe, the Tyler
Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard University, wrote the foreword to Senator Paul
191
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Simon’s book Advice and Consent.193 This book is a compelling study of the Robert Bork
and Clarence Thomas Supreme Court of the United States nomination battles, along with a
historical study of the United States Senate’s role in many other nomination fights. Tribe
states:
Since 1969, however, eleven Supreme Court appointments in a row–
from Warren Burger in 1969 to Clarence Thomas in 1991–have been made by
Republican Presidents applying increasingly ideological criteria, with the
Senate dutifully confirming all these nominees except Judge Bork. Despite
decades of divided government, the current Supreme Court is one of the least
philosophically diverse Courts in American history and can hardly be said to
reflect the range of mainstream constitutional and legal views. Any Court
this lopsided–in any direction–is bound to overlook vital issues, engage in
relatively shallow and constricted internal debate, and deprive the future of
the great dissents that have so often been destined to become the law long
after they have been issued. . . .
To grasp the truly unprecedented nature of the contemporary pattern–
with the most recent eleven Supreme Court vacancies filled by Republican
Presidents–it is necessary to realize that only four times in all of American
history have Presidents of a single political party named more than ten Justices
in a row. . .194
As I have argued, Washington/Vacco cannot be the proper interpretation of
the United States Constitution concerning the Constitutional right to privacy in making
medical decisions. As one may now finally put it, such a decision will not stand the test of
time, basically because it was a political decision and not a constitutional decision. Rather,
the understanding and appreciation of the United States Constitution is better served by the
decisions of Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade.

As David Garrow stated:

But in the end, Harry Blackmun grasped perhaps the simplest but
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eventually the most long-forgotten truth of all: “Roe against Wade
was not such a revolutionary opinion at the time.”195
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